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LAW AND SURPLUS: OPPORTUNITIES MISSED
Michael D. Guttentag*
Abstract
Surplus is a ubiquitous feature of economic activity. The ubiquity of
surplus challenges us to find fair and efficient ways to share resources.
This is the surplus problem. This Article documents the miscues and
mistaken assumptions that have left research on how legal rules can
address the surplus problem woefully underexplored.
Three missed opportunities are particularly noteworthy. First,
scholars studying “rent-seeking” mistakenly limit their investigation of
links between surplus and wasteful competition to situations involving
grants of government privilege. Second, law and economics scholars
incorrectly assume that a laissez-faire approach is presumptively the
best way to address the surplus problem. Finally, consumer law scholars
fail to recognize how central solving the surplus problem is to providing
a sound economic justification for consumer protection law.
Collectively, these case studies illustrate how law’s role in
addressing the surplus problem has been shunted to the periphery of
legal scholarship rather than placed at the center of legal discourse
where it rightly belongs.
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INTRODUCTION
Surplus is a ubiquitous feature of economic activity.1 There is a surplus, for
example, whenever one party’s gain from a trade exceeds the other party’s cost.
The graph of a downward-sloping demand curve intersecting an upward-sloping
supply curve is a staple of microeconomics textbooks.2 This graph offers a simple
way to visualize the surplus that arises from market transactions. The area below
the demand curve and above the supply curve is the amount of surplus in a
particular marketplace, as illustrated in Figure 1.3

1

For a discussion of the surplus terminology, including how and why it is used
throughout this Article, see infra note 79.
2
See, e.g., ROBERT FRANK, MICROECONOMICS AND BEHAVIOR 320 (2010); ANDREU
MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMICS THEORY 320 (1995); ROBERT S. PINDYCK &
DANIEL RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 25 (8th ed. 2013); HAL R. VARIAN,
MICROECONOMICS ANALYSIS AND BEHAVIOR 320 (3d ed. 1992). See also JONATHAN
GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 48 (3d ed. 2013); RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11 (8th ed. 2011).
3
The relationship between a graph of supply and demand and the amount of surplus
in a market may not be exact depending upon whether the supply and demand curves
reflect wealth effects caused by price changes for the product under consideration. See
VARIAN, supra note 2, at 161; Jerry A. Hausman, Exact Consumer’s Surplus and
Deadweight Loss, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 662 (1981). It is also true that this simplification
ignores well-known differences between willingness to pay and willingness to accept. See,
e.g., Jonathan Chapman et al., Econographics 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 24931, 2018).
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It is not difficult to find real world examples suggesting that markets are
teeming with surplus. A wealthy person can purchase a copy of “Hillbilly Elegy: A
Memoir of a Family and Culture in Crisis” for only $17 on Amazon even if she is
willing to pay $50 for a copy of the book.4 There is at least a $33 surplus in this
transaction because this particular purchaser values the book so much more than
the marginal purchaser does.5
Likewise, pharmaceutical companies are able to charge phenomenally high
prices for life-saving drugs, even if the actual cost of the particular treatment is
minimal. For example, Gilead Science charges $100,000 for a twelve-week course
of treatment with the drug Harvoni, a drug that can cure Hepatitis C. Gilead would
still profit mightily if it were to sell Harvoni for half that price.6
4

J.D. VANCE, HILLBILLY ELEGY: A MEMOIR OF A FAMILY AND CULTURE IN CRISIS
(2016). The price on Amazon for a hardcopy print version of this book was $16.79 on Feb.
4, 2019. See Hillbilly Elegy: A Memoir of a Family and Culture in Crisis, AMAZON.COM,
https://www.amazon.com/Hillbilly-Elegy-Memoir-Family-Culture/dp/0062300547
(last
visited Feb. 4, 2019).
5
Amazon might also realize a gain from this transaction, increasing the resulting
surplus.
6
In its 2016 fiscal year, Gilead had an astoundingly high gross profit margin of 86%
and a net profit margin of 44%. For a thorough and comprehensive discussion of Harvoni
pricing that shows, among other things, how 28 U.S.C. §1498 might be used to make this
drug more widely available, see Hannah Brennan et al., A Prescription for Excessive Drug
Pricing: Leveraging Government Patent Use for Health, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 275 (2016).
In September of 2018 Gilead announced plans to sell a generic version of the same drug at
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The goal when sharing a surplus should be to do so in as fair and efficient a
manner as possible. Determining how to achieve this result requires solving what I
coin here as the “surplus problem.” The insight that legal rules can help to address
the surplus problem is an old one. King Solomon’s proposal to divide a baby
evenly between the two women who claim to be the baby’s mother is one famous
example.7
Philosophers studying distributive justice have grappled with the question of
what constitutes a fair and efficient sharing of surplus. Robert Nozick and John
Rawls, for example, take diametrically opposed positions. While Nozick argues
that the rule should essentially be “finders keepers,” Rawls recommends surplus be
pooled and distributed to those most in need.8 How to divide surplus fairly and
efficiently is a burgeoning area of research in a number of disciplines.9
One would expect there also to be a rich body of legal scholarship analyzing
how legal rules can address the surplus problem. Yet, very little such scholarship
a list price of $24,000. Gilead to Sell Authorized Versions of Hep C Treatment, PHARMACY
TIMES, Sept. 25, 2018.
The observation that there can be a substantial surplus when life-saving drugs cost
relatively little to produce, and that the current regime often grants much of that surplus
value to the pharmaceutical company does not, of course, address many issues raised by
this particular policy. It may be that awarding the surplus to pharmaceutical companies in
this context is desirable from a social welfare perspective, because doing so spurs efficient
levels of research and investment. See infra Section I.C.
7
STEVEN J. BRAMS & ALAN D. TAYLOR, FAIR DIVISION: FROM CAKE-CUTTING TO
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 6–7 (1996) (discussing King Solomon’s proposal as the first written
record of a fair division of surplus). My apologies if it seems a bit crass to call a baby a
“surplus,” and, of course, King Solomon’s proposed solution of actually splitting the baby
into two parts did have potential flaws.
8
DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT 276 (1986) (“Nozick would treat the
right to [surplus] as a component of liberty, [while] John Rawls would not only demand its
confiscation, but its redistribution so that, in effect, the surplus . . . would be enjoyed by
those lacking.”).
9
See, e.g., BRAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 7 (providing an overview of the contest
literature); KAI A. KONRAD, STRATEGY AND DYNAMICS IN CONTESTS 1–21 (2009)
(surveying the contest literature); Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, Dynamic
Mechanism Design: An Introduction, J. ECON. LITERATURE (forthcoming 2019) (providing
a review of scholarship on dynamic mechanism design); Subhasish M. Chowdhury &
David A. Malueg, Introduction to the Symposium – Contests: Theory and Evidence, 56
ECON. INQUIRY 1445 (2018) (introducing a symposium on how to apply contest theory to
more practical problems); Luis C. Corchón, The Theory of Contests, 11 REV. ECON.
DESIGN 69 (2007) (defining contests as situations where agents fight over property rights
and providing an overview of different modeling approaches and applications). In
economics, the study of when and why workers rather than producers capture surplus is
going through a Renaissance. See, e.g., David Autor et al., Concentrating on the Falling
Labor Share, 107 AM. ECON. REV. 180 (2017) (reviewing potential links between the rise
of superstar firms and the decline in labor’s share of GDP).
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exists.10 A few legal scholars who have considered how laws can reduce wasteful
competition for surplus in specific contexts, such as when negotiating a merger or
deciding how to share attorneys’ fees.11 Various law reviews articles written over
the past fifty years might be reconceptualized as inchoate efforts to identify and
analyze legal solutions to the surplus problem.12 Finally, Robert Hale, a Columbia
Law School professor, whose research spanned from 1918 through 1953,
considered many of the issues involved in finding legal solutions to the surplus
problem.13
However, for the most part, legal scholars have shown little interest in
exploring how to use the law to allocate surplus in a fair and efficient manner. This
Article details how such a significant oversight has come to pass. The story of
legal scholarship’s failure to address fully this relationship is one of missed
opportunities. Three different areas of legal research should have naturally
proceeded to a careful examination of the ways in which legal rules can facilitate
the fair and efficient sharing of a surplus. All three have failed to do so.
10

A full intellectual history of the ways in which previous legal scholars have
engaged with legal solutions to the surplus problem is beyond the scope of this Article.
11
See, e.g., Steven J. Brams & Joshua Mitts, Law and Mechanism Design:
Procedures to Induce Honest Bargaining, 68 NYU ANN. SURV. AM. L. 729 (2013); Amy
Farmer & Paul Pecorino, Legal Expenditure as a Rent-Seeking Game, 100 PUB. CHOICE
271 (1999); and Edward K. Cheng et al., Fair Division of Attorneys’ Fees (Vanderbilt
Univ. Law Sch., Working Paper No. 18-51, 2018).
12
See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the
Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE
L.J. 1093 (1971) (exploring conditions under which increased housing code enforcement
will benefit the needy); Matthew A. Edwards, Price and Prejudice: The Case Against
Consumer Equality in the Information Age, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 559 (2006)
(describing efforts to capture consumer surplus by use of dynamic, differential, and
personalized pricing, and considering the social costs and benefits of these practices);
Robert Hockett, Putting Distribution First, 18 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 157 (2017)
(explaining how efforts to maximize efficiency require making assumptions about
distribution and equalization); Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalistic Motives in
Contract and Tort Law, With Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal
Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982) (identifying distributive and paternalistic
motives in the law of agreements, and justifying the application of paternalistic motives in
this context); Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L.
REV. 55 (2001) (discussing the social welfare costs and benefits of price discrimination in
the context of copyright law) [hereinafter Meurer, Copyright Law]; Michael J. Meurer, Fair
Division, 47 BUFFALO L. REV. 937 (1999) (considering how economic analysis of fairness
might have relevance to legal scholarship); and Liam Murphy & Thomas Nagel, Taxes,
Redistribution, and Public Provision, 30 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 53 (2001) (distinguishing
between spending on government run programs and using taxes to promote distributive
justice).
13
See, e.g., BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE:
ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 7, 25–27, 108–59, 213–14
(1998) (describing Hale’s scholarship as “progressive rent theory”).
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The first group of scholars, who approached but then surprisingly veered
away from a thorough consideration of the relationships between law and surplus,
are those who initiated research into “rent-seeking.”14 These scholars study “the
resource-wasting activities of individuals in seeking transfers of wealth through the
aegis of the state.”15 They observe that competition for government-created
monopoly rights is both hard to avoid and inherently wasteful. However, their
central insight—that the fight for surplus is both hard to prevent and inherently
wasteful—should be applied to situations other than just those involving the fight
for government-created monopoly rights.
Rent-seeking scholars offer several justifications for limiting their research to
situations involving “transfers of wealth through the aegis of the state.” One
justification they offer is that the fight for surplus in the broader economy is a
minor and transitory phenomenon. This is incorrect. Surplus is economically
significant and enduring.16 Moreover, the fight for surplus is an increasingly
important economic phenomenon as big data technologies energize the shift
toward personalized pricing.17 The fight for surplus is not a minor phenomenon in
the broader economy.
Another justification rent-seeking scholars offer for restricting the scope of
their investigation is their belief that leaving the surplus problem unregulated will
encourage desirable levels of investment and innovation.18 Again, this is incorrect.
As scholars studying intellectual property know well, leaving the fight for surplus
unregulated can create beneficial incentives for investment and innovation, but it
can also lead to a socially wasteful race to capture surplus.19 Rent-seeking scholars
erred when they limited research on legal solutions to the surplus problem to the
study of the wasteful competition for government-created monopoly rights.
The second group of scholars I consider are those who work within the law
and economics tradition.20 These scholars have developed the skills and tools that
would be quite helpful in evaluating how legal rules might be used to share surplus
in ways that are both fair and efficient. On rare occasions, these scholars do, in
fact, engage in this type of analysis.21 A nice example comes from Richard
Posner’s discussion of the rule of salvage in admiralty law.22 Posner observes that
limiting the rewards provided to those who carry out a rescue at sea prevents
sailors from investing too many resources in a socially wasteful race to be the first
ship to carry out the rescue. This type of direct engagement with the surplus
14

See infra Part I.
JAMES M. BUCHANAN ET AL., TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY
ix (1980).
16
See infra Subsections I.B.1. and I.B.2.
17
See infra Subsection I.B.3.
18
See infra Section I.C.
19
As an example of this insight, as presented in intellectual property scholarship, see
Meurer, Copyright Law, supra note 12, at 66 n.37.
20
See infra Part II.
21
See infra Section II.A.
22
See infra notes 145 to 147 and accompanying text.
15
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problem by law and economics scholars is rare.
However, unlike scholars who study rent-seeking, law and economics
scholars do not offer explicit justifications for failing to address the surplus
problem more systematically. Fortunately, one can discern four assumptions that
appear to have led law and economics scholars to avoid this topic. These
assumptions are: (1) that private parties will negotiate around legal interventions
designed to alter surplus sharing arrangements;23 (2) that it is unethical to use legal
rules to alter surplus sharing arrangements mutually agreed upon by private
actors;24 (3) that mixed findings about the social welfare effects of price
discrimination (the practice of charging customers different prices for reasons
other than cost) show that it is a hopeless exercise to devise rules to allocate
surplus fairly and efficiently;25 and (4) that it is a mistake to include fairness
concerns when considering legal solutions to the surplus problem, because tax
policy is superior to legal rules as a way to address fairness concerns and because
firms will address customer preferences for “fair” pricing practices without legal
intervention.26
All four assumptions are flawed. First, while there may be situations where
changing legal rules will not alter how a surplus is ultimately shared, there is no
reason to believe that laws altering surplus sharing arrangements will inevitably
fall into this category.27 Second, moral objections to regulating market activity,
because doing so would require altering terms agreed upon by private parties, is
unlikely to provide most law and economics scholars an adequate justification for
ignoring benefits from legal solutions to the surplus problem.28 Third, scholarship
on price discrimination has too many shortcomings to be relied upon to justify
avoiding careful study of the law’s role in addressing the surplus problem.29
Fourth, arguments relied upon in the law and economics scholarship to justify
setting aside fairness considerations are not germane when evaluating legal rules
designed to address the surplus problem for two reasons. First, the claim that tax
policy is superior to legal rules as a way to redistribute wealth is inapposite when
considering legal solutions to the surplus problem.30 Second, an argument that one
can rely on market incentives to ensure firms adopt “fair” pricing practices fails to
recognize that profiting from “unfair” pricing practices often involves transfers of
surplus that provide private, not social, welfare gains.31 Law and economics
scholars have avoided questions involving law and surplus because of their
reliance on a number of assumptions that all prove faulty.
23

See infra Subsection II.B.1.
See infra Subsection II.B.2.
25
See infra Subsection II.B.3.
26
See infra Subsection II.B.4.
27
See infra notes 175 to 179 and accompanying text.
28
See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
29
See infra notes 198 to 199 and accompanying text.
30
See infra notes 202 to 206 and accompanying text.
31
See infra note 216 and accompanying text.
24
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The third group of scholars whose work I consider are those who study laws
designed to protect consumers.32 These scholars should be among those most
interested in exploring how legal rules can work to ensure that economic surplus is
shared in a fair and efficient manner, but they also fail to do so.
More specifically, economically-oriented consumer law scholars instead rely
on more “traditional” market failure arguments, such as a lemons market failure
argument or an argument based on the problem of behavioral exploitation, to
justify implementing laws designed to protect consumers. The lemons market
failure arises when it is difficult to ascertain product quality at the time of
purchase.33 One result of this difficulty is that poorer quality products can force
those selling higher quality products to exit the market.34 Another market failure on
which economically-oriented consumer law scholars have focused their attention is
the failure of consumers to recognize imperfections and biases in their own
decision-making processes.35 One consequence of this failing is that pernicious
sellers are able to profit by selling goods that consumers either do not want or
would have chosen to pay much less for in the absence of these exploitative
practices.
The lemons market failure and behavioral exploitation are certainly problems
worthy of careful investigation. However, the surplus problem should also be of
immediate concern to economically-oriented consumer law scholars. Both the
waste associated with resources spent to take surplus from consumers and the
potentially regressive effects of these efforts are significant. These effects provide
a powerful justification for protecting consumers from unscrupulous business
practices that is distinct from the market failure concerns economically-oriented
consumer law scholars choose to focus on.
Three different areas of legal scholarship should have proceeded to a careful
examination of the ways in which legal rules can facilitate the fair and efficient
sharing of a surplus. All three failed to do so. Rent-seeking scholars emphasize the
wasteful nature of competition for surplus, but then ignore the broader
ramifications of this important insight. Law and economics scholars develop a rich
set of analytical tools but rarely apply them to the surplus problem. Economicallyoriented consumer law scholars ignore the battle for surplus that consumers
predictably lose unless the consumer’s loss is caused by a “traditional” market
failure. Before proceeding to a more detailed analysis of these failings, a larger
question needs to be answered. Why has the study of law’s role in addressing the
surplus problem been shunted to the periphery of legal scholarship by so many
legal scholars?
The most likely explanation is that most legal scholars who study markets
have unwittingly but systematically fallen into a familiar trap. These scholars have
32

See infra Part III.
George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market, 3 Q.J. ECON. 488, 488 (1970) (explaining the lemons market failure is a species of
the more general class of market failures associated with information asymmetries).
34
See infra Section III.A.
35
See infra Section III.B.
33
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failed to recognize that markets do not work equally well at addressing two related
but quite distinct challenges. The first challenge involves efficiently allocating
scarce resources. At the price where supply equals demand, wonderful properties
abound: the much-heralded workings of Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” are
revealed, 36 and, in the simplest case, assets are efficiently allocated throughout
society.37 When relying on markets to allocate resources efficiently, legal rules
have a well-defined role. Legal rules address market failures, such as information
asymmetries, the presence of externalities, or the abuse of monopoly power.38
Then, if the legal rules work, the market does its magic.
The second challenge that arises in a market economy involves figuring out
how best to share a surplus. The goal in sharing a surplus is to do so in a fair and
efficient manner. In addressing this second challenge, the “invisible hand” is as
likely to destroy value as it is to create value. The defining feature of the surplus
problem is that one party’s gain is the other party’s loss. In this context, there is no
social gain from competition. As A. C. Pigou observed a century ago, “intelligence
and resources devoted to [bargaining], whether on one side or on the other, and
whether successful or unsuccessful, yield no net product to the community as a
whole . . . . These activities are wasted. They contribute to private, but not to social
net product.”39

36

ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH

OF

NATIONS, Book IV, Chapter II, paragraph IX

(1776).
37

This result is known as the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics.
FRANK, supra note 2, at 346 (“One of the most attractive features of competitive markets is
the fact that they result in allocative efficiency, which means that they fully exploit the
possibilities for mutual gains through exchange.”) (emphasis removed); GRUBER, supra
note 2, at 50 (“The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics [is that] the
competitive equilibrium, where supply equals demand, maximizes social efficiency.”)
(emphasis removed).
38
See, e.g., RICHARD MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 7–15 (1959).
39
Pigou used as an example “competitive advertisement directed to the sole purpose
of transferring the demand for a given commodity from one source of supply to another.”
ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 196 (1920) (citation omitted). Pigou
observed that in this scenario “all units of resources expended by either producer in
building up goodwill as against the other shall have a social net product equal to zero.” Id.
at 199.
Unlike situations where the so-called “Pigouvian tax” provides a relatively simple
way to ensure that firms internalize externalities, Pigou saw no simple way to avoid this
form of waste. Pigou recognized that an “absolute prohibition of bargaining is hardly
feasible except where prices and conditions of sale are imposed upon private industry by
some organ of State authority.” Id. at 199.
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Leaving the fight for surplus to private parties must rest on different analytical
foundations than does a choice to rely on markets to allocate resources efficiently.
Failing to realize that the role of law in sharing a surplus is different from the role
of law in facilitating allocative efficiency can lead to the mistaken presumption
that a laissez-faire approach to the distribution of surplus is usually preferable.
Legal scholars have missed this subtle but important distinction. A major area of
potential scholarly endeavor and insight remains virtually unexplored.40
I. SURPLUS, WASTE, AND RENT-SEEKING
This Part reviews research on the phenomenon known as “rent-seeking.”
Scholars studying rent-seeking define the topic as involving the study of “the
resource-wasting activities of individuals in seeking transfers of wealth through the
aegis of the state.”41
This Part begins with a survey of rent-seeking scholarship and the insights
this scholarship offers into the link between surplus and waste. The discussion then
reviews the justifications these scholars offer for limiting analysis of the link
between surplus and waste to situations involving government-created monopoly
rights. The two main arguments offered by these scholars for limiting their
research agenda in this manner are: (1) that surplus in the broader economy is a
minor and transitory phenomenon; and (2) that markets allocate surplus in ways
that encourage desirable levels of investment and innovation.
The discussion in this Part then challenges these arguments. First, contrary to
the assumptions of the rent-seeking scholars, surplus is shown to be a large,
ubiquitous, and increasingly important phenomenon throughout the economy.42
Second, the discussion explains why it is a mistake to assume, as most rent-seeking
scholars do, that leaving the allocation of surplus to market forces will lead to
desirable levels of investment and innovation.43
In summary, the analysis in this Part shows rent-seeking scholars made a
mistake when they limited research on their important insight about the link
between surplus and waste to the study of government-created monopoly rights.
A. Rent-Seeking Scholarship
One of the foundational insights from Adam Smith’s work on economics is
that pursuit of self-interest in market transactions can benefit all. Smith famously
observed: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker
that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.”44
40

II.A.

41

For exceptions, see supra notes 11 to 13 and accompanying text, and infra Section

BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 15, at ix.
See infra Section I.B.
43
See infra Section I.C.
44
SMITH, supra note 36, at Book 1, Chapter II.
42
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Subsequent research suggested that various refinements had to be added to
Smith’s basic insight. For example, if activities impose costs or provide benefits
that are not included in the prices for goods and services (externalities), then
private incentives will not align with social welfare.45 Other well-recognized ways
in which markets can fail to enhance social welfare if left unregulated, include
problems that arise: when firms accumulate too much market power, in attempting
to provide for the production of an optimal amount of a public good, and when
attempting to achieve a socially desirable distribution of wealth.46
In 1967, Gordon Tullock published an article titled “The Welfare Costs of
Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft” that identified a previously underappreciated, but
quite important, additional situation where permitting market competition to go
unfettered would be wasteful rather than socially beneficial: when competition
involves the fight for a surplus.47 The specific goal of Tullock’s article was more
limited. He wanted to address findings by economists published in the 1950s and
1960s suggesting that monopoly practices resulted in relatively small costs to
society.48 Tullock argued that these findings underestimated the true cost of
monopoly practices, because these findings did not include any measure of the
resources invested to gain control of monopoly profits.49
Tullock offered money spent to encourage governments to impose tariffs on
foreign goods as the quintessential example of wasteful competition for surplus.
He writes:
45
See generally PIGOU, supra note 39, at 172–203. The mismatch between private
incentives and social welfare can be addressed in a variety of ways, including by imposing
a tax that moves private party prices closer to true social costs (a Pigouvian tax), see
PIGOU, supra note 39, at 192, by setting output at a socially optimal level, see, e.g., Martin
L. Weitzman, Prices vs. Quantities, 41 REV. ECON. STUD. 477, 479 (1974), or by selecting
laws that encourage negotiation between the parties affected, see, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99
YALE L.J. 87, 87–88 (1989).
46
See, e.g., MUSGRAVE, supra 38, at 7–15.
47
Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 WESTERN
ECON. J. 224, 228 (1967) [hereinafter Tullock, Welfare Costs]. This article is the wellspring
for research into the phenomenon that came to be known as “rent-seeking.” One could
argue that the rent-seeking scholarship merely extends the traditional externality analysis to
a situation in which profits realized by one party impose a negative externality on the
competitor who must lose at least the equivalent amount of profits. See, e.g., KONRAD,
supra note 9, at 19 (“A contest [which is the formal name for the situation Tullock
identified] is a game with strong mutual externalities: a contestant who expends more effort
increases his likelihood of winning the prize. But, at the same time, this increase in winning
probability must imply that other contestants have a reduced probability of winning. This is
the fundamental externality that is at work in contests.”).
48
Gordon Tullock, The Origin Rent-Seeking Concept, 2 INT’L J. BUS. & ECON. 1, 3
(2003) [hereinafter Tullock, Origin].
49
Tullock, Welfare Costs, supra note 47, at 231 (“Surely we would expect that with a
prize of this size dangling before our eyes, potential monopolists would be willing to invest
large resources in the activity of monopolizing.”).
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One would anticipate that the domestic producers would invest resources
in lobbying for the tariff until the marginal return on the last dollar so
spent was equal to its likely return producing the transfer . . . . These
expenditures, which may simply offset each other to some extent, are
purely wasteful from the standpoint of society as a whole; they are spent
not on increasing wealth, but in attempts to transfer or resist transfer of
wealth.50
However, the choice of these scholars to adopt terms like “rent-seeking”51 and
“rent dissipation”52 to describe costly efforts to gain control of government-created
monopoly rights is puzzling. Economists generally use the term “rent” to refer to
amounts earned in excess of costs, following the pioneering work of David
Ricardo.53 The use of the “rent” terminology by scholars following Tullock does
not match up well with the use of the term introduced by Ricardo. Ricardo used the
term rent to describe a ubiquitous economic phenomenon that occurs whenever the
market price exceeds cost for a particular seller. Scholars using the term rentseeking focus on a much narrower swath of economic activity in their analysis of
the waste associated with competition for surplus.54 This disconnect raises the
question as to why those studying rent-seeking cabin their analysis to situations
involving government-created monopoly rights, rather than consider costs from the
fight for surplus arising in the broader context of rents described by Ricardo.
There are two possible explanations as to why scholars studying rent-seeking
limit their analysis in this manner. First, these scholars may simply have failed to
realize that the phenomenon they focus on involves only one small component of
rent as the concept is generally understood by economists. Second, these scholars
may have limited their study of rent-seeking because they viewed governmentcreated monopoly rights as the only context in which the contest for surplus is
problematic.55
50

Id. at 228.
Anne Krueger in a 1974 article “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking
Society” coined the term “rent-seeking” to describe the wasteful efforts described by
Tullock “aimed at obtaining special government privilege.” Anne O. Krueger, The Political
Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291, 291 (1974).
52
See, e.g., Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78
VA. L. REV. 305, 307 (1992); Dean Lueck, The Rule of First Possession and the Design of
the Law, 38 J.L. & ECON. 393, 395 (1995).
53
See DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 67–
84 (1817). For a more detailed discussion of “Ricardian rents,” see infra notes 89, 90, and
accompanying text. For an explanation as to why the term used throughout this Article is
surplus rather than rent, see infra note 79.
54
But see Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Directly Unproductive, Profit-seeking (DUP)
Activities, 90 J. POL. ECON. 988, 991 (1982) (“What I argue in this paper can be simply
extended to private activities, therefore, even though virtually all examples chosen below
concern governmental policy-related DUP activities exclusively.”).
55
Tullock in subsequent writings offers a third possible justification for primarily
51
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A careful reading of the rent-seeking scholarship suggests this second
rationale—the belief that the fight for rents outside of the government-created
monopoly rights context is not especially problematic—explains why these
scholars focus on waste arising from the fight for government-created monopoly
rights. Perhaps the best evidence of reliance on this second rationale comes from a
book chapter titled “Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking” written by James
Buchanan.56 Buchanan begins this book chapter with a definition of rent-seeking
that echoes the broader definition of rent used by economists more generally.57
Buchanan writes that the term rent-seeking derives from the “standard textbook . . .
economic theory” definition of rent as:
. . . that part of the payment to an owner of resources over and above that
which those resources could command in any alternative use. Rent is
receipt in excess of opportunity cost. In one sense, it is an allocatively
unnecessary payment not required to attract the resources to the
particular employment.58
Buchanan next acknowledges that one implication of this broad definition of
rent is that those engaged in the study of rent-seeking would appear to be engaged
in the study of a broad swath of economic activity. He observes that “[s]o long as
owners of resources prefer more to less, they are likely to be engaged in rent
seeking, which is simply another word for profit seeking.”59 Thus far, Buchanan’s
discussion suggests those studying a phenomenon labeled rent-seeking should not
focus exclusively on rent dissipation in situations where the aegis of government is
involved.
Buchanan then explains why he believes those studying rent-seeking can
safely restrict the scope of their investigation. He writes that rent-seeking outside
of “transfers of wealth through the aegis of the state” can be excluded from the
analysis because, where there is no government intervention, problems from rent
focusing on the waste arising from resources spent to capture monopoly profits created by
government activity. Tullock appears to have believed that industrial organization
economists had adequately addressed the costs of competition for monopoly profits in other
domains. Tullock writes that: “In the industrial organization literature, economists had
already recognized that firms would invest in building barriers to entry. A good example is
advertising. However, the focus of my article – and the part that was to be most important
in the development of the concept of rent-seeking – was investment in the activity of
securing protection from the government.” Tullock, Origin, supra note 48, at 4 (citation
omitted).
56
James M. Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in JAMES M. BUCHANAN ET
AL., TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 3–15 (1980).
57
With respect to economists’ definition of what constitutes rent generally, see, e.g.,
GRUBER, supra note 2, at G-9 (defining rents as “payments to resource deliverers that
exceed those necessary to employ the resource”). See also POSNER, supra note 2, at 11–12
(defining rents as including both consumer surplus and producer surplus).
58
Buchanan, supra note 56, at 3.
59
Id.
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dissipation will not arise.60 He contrasts rent-seeking with what he defines as rentcreation and concludes “[t]he entrepreneurial activity of rent creation is
functionally quite different from that of rent seeking.”61
The reasoning Buchanan offers in support of his claim that those studying
rent-seeking need not be concerned with the social costs of such activities in the
broader market context is unpersuasive. His argument begins with a reference to
Adam Smith and Smith’s claim that only with the pursuit of self-interest “do
markets work in getting resources allocated efficiently among competing uses.”62
Relying on the efficacy of markets as a tool for allocative efficiency to justify
relying on markets to share surplus fairly and efficiently repeats a similar
confusion among legal scholars discussed in the Introduction.63 If the question is
how to facilitate the sharing of a rent or a surplus in a fair and efficient manner,
then insights from Smith about how markets allocate assets efficiently through the
price mechanism are not germane.
Buchanan then offers an alternative and slightly more refined justification for
limiting investigation of the costs of rent-seeking to situations involving the
competition for special government privilege. He argues that “the social marginal
product of profit seeking exceeds private marginal product”64 outside of the
government-created monopoly rights context. By this, he appears to mean that the
benefits to the economy from rent-seeking activities outweigh the costs in
situations other than the contest for government-created monopoly rights.
However, Buchanan provides no evidence to support this assertion.
Buchanan makes a similar assertion later in the same chapter when he offers a
modified definition of rent seeking as the study of “behavior in institutional
settings where individual efforts to maximize value generate social waste rather
than social surplus.”65 For Buchanan the relevant institutional setting in which such
activity is problematic is only in “the near chaos of direct political allocation.”66
Again, no evidence is offered to support the assertion. The argument appears to be
that evidence that competition for government-created monopoly rights is more
wasteful than other rent-seeking activities shows that all other rent-seeking
activities are not problematic. The flaw in this logic is obvious. Another argument
Buchanan offers is that costs arising from the competition for rents in an “ordered
market structure” can be ignored, because these costs are transitory. Buchanan
writes that “in market systems, all economic rent tends to be eroded or dissipated
as adjustments take place through time.”67
A final line of argument Buchanan advances for limiting investigation of the
costs of rent-seeking to situations involving the competition for special
60

Id.
Id. at 7.
62
Id. at 4.
63
See supra notes 36 to 39 and accompanying text.
64
Buchanan, supra note 56, at 4.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
61
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government privilege is that competition for surplus in market transactions
provides socially desirable incentives for firms to invest and innovate. Buchanan
writes that in “an ordered market structure, the potential attractiveness of economic
rents offers the motivation to resource owners and to entrepreneurs who combine
resources into production.”68 Buchanan makes this claim without offering any
supporting evidence.
Many of Buchanan’s rationales for ignoring the costs of rent-seeking in the
broader economy are echoed by Tullock. Tullock acknowledges that unfettered
competition can be wasteful, observing: “This illustrates a very old point in
economics. Competition is not always a good thing.”69 However, like Buchanan,
Tullock views the wasteful nature of competition as only problematic in a poorlyorganized market, writing: “In a well-organized market, the individuals aiming
solely at benefiting themselves end up benefiting other people. In a sufficiently
badly organized market . . . they simply generate waste.”70 Tullock also justifies
ignoring the costs of competition for surplus outside of the government-created
monopoly rights context by arguing that the stakes involved in these other venues
are small. He writes that: “Private businessmen do a good deal of rent seeking and
rent avoidance, too, but it is a relatively minor factor.”71 However, as with
Buchanan, Tullock does not offer any evidence to support the conclusion that rentseeking is not wasteful in the broader market context.
Edward Rice and Thomas Ulen acknowledge that earlier scholars studying
rent-seeking had assumed without proof that rent-seeking activities broadly
defined were not problematic.72 Unfortunately, Rice and Ulen’s efforts to address
this shortcoming are unsatisfying. Rice and Ulen argue that when the socially
desirable benefits from incentives to innovate provided by rent-capturing
opportunities are included in the analysis, the static costs of competition for rent
identified by Tullock overstate the true costs of rent-seeking. Moreover, according
to Rice and Ulen, these benefits are more prevalent when the competition for rent
does not involve government activities. They conclude that this countervailing
benefit justifies the distinction Tullock draws “between monopoly rights which are
guaranteed and enforced by the state and those which are not.”73
However, Rice and Ulen provide no evidence to support the conclusion that
when investment incentives are included competition for rent is welfare enhancing.
Nor do they consider in their analysis alternatives to unfettered competition for
surplus. Rice and Ulen simply cite Joseph Schumpeter to justify their conclusion
that “unfettered competition for monopoly rent is, as Schumpeter noted long ago,
the essence of the competitive process. Although there may be some social costs
68

Id. at 5.
Gordon Tullock, Rent Seeking as a Negative Sum Game, in JAMES M. BUCHANAN
ET AL., TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 31 (1980).
70
Id.
71
Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
72
Edward M. Rice & Thomas S. Ulen, Rent-Seeking and Welfare Loss, in 3
RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 53 (1981).
73
Id. at 54.
69
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associated with competitive rent-seeking, the social benefit, such as cost-reducing
innovation and improved products, are likely far greater . . . .”74 For Rice and Ulen
the choice is bimodal: accept the costs of unfettered competition, or lose the social
benefits provided by the competition for surplus. Based on this dichotomy, Rice
and Ulen conclude that the waste associated with competition for surplus is a
necessary and desirable feature of a market economy.
In summary, scholars studying rent-seeking take an important first step to
help better understand how legal rules can help to share surplus fairly and
efficiently. Their research highlights why unfettered competition for a surplus can
be wasteful. However, these scholars fail to investigate further how legal rules can
mitigate these costs, primarily because of their reliance on two faulty
assumptions.75 First, these scholars wrongly assume that the surplus problem is of
minimal importance in well-functioning markets.76 Second, these scholars wrongly
assume that allowing market forces to dictate surplus sharing arrangements leads
to desirable levels of investment and innovation.77 Both of these assumptions are
faulty for the reasons detailed below.
B. Surplus Throughout the Economy
Those who study rent-seeking recognize that competition for surplus invites
waste. However, these scholars limit their study of this dynamic to situations
involving competition for government-created monopoly rights. The two reasons
these scholars cabin their research in this manner were detailed above.78 The
discussion below shows why neither of these justifications withstands careful
scrutiny. First, contrary to suggestions from Buchanan and other rent-seeking
scholars, surplus and the ensuing competition for surplus in market economies is
neither ephemeral nor modest in size. Second, there is not a convincing argument
that leaving the fight for surplus to market participants offers the best method to
achieve desirable levels of investment or innovation.
1. Sources
Before addressing the claim that surplus is an ephemeral and minor
phenomenon in our economy, it is helpful to define the term surplus more precisely
and to identify the various sources of surplus.

74

Id. at 63.
This failing is not complete. Most notably, work by Richard Posner on the
admiralty law rule of salvage considers how legal rules can mitigate costs arising from
wasteful competition for surplus. See infra notes 145 to 150 and accompanying text.
76
See supra notes 67, 71, and accompanying text.
77
See supra notes 68, 74, and accompanying text.
78
See supra Section I.A.
75
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There are two ways to define what constitutes a surplus.79 One approach is to
define an amount as a surplus when there is more of a good available than anybody
could possibly want. Definitions suggesting this meaning of surplus include “the
amount that remains when use or need is satisfied,”80 or, similarly, the amount that
is “left over when requirements have been met.”81 This meaning is not particularly
helpful for analytical purposes, because of the ambiguity inherent in determining
when needs are fully satisfied or requirements sufficiently met for a surplus to
exist.
More helpful is a definition of surplus that refers to benefits in excess of costs.
Examples of definitions based on this meaning include “the amount of receipts
over disbursements”82 or “an excess of supply or production over demand.”83 This
Article will rely on this more measurable meaning of what constitutes a surplus. In
application, this definition means here that, at a minimum, a surplus exists
whenever a gain can be realized by trade.84 The amount of the surplus in such a
79

This footnote explains the choice to use the term “surplus” to describe the
economic phenomenon discussed throughout this Article. Economists going back to Alfred
Marshall use the term “surplus” to describe the area below the demand curve and above the
supply curve. ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 78, 241, 272 (1890).
Another term used in various contexts to refer to the area between willingness to pay and
willingness to sell is ‘rent.’ I choose to use the term surplus rather than rent for at least two
reasons. First, the popular meaning of the word ‘rent’ – amounts paid to a landlord – is
quite different from the intended meaning here. Second, David Ricardo originally used the
term rent to describe amounts earned by landowners as a result of owning higher quality
land. RICARDO, supra note 53, at 67–84. Ricardo thus uses the term rent in a narrower
sense than the term surplus is used here in two respects. First, what Ricardo describes as
rent would only include what economists now describe as producer surplus. Producer
surplus represents the extent to which some producers receive benefits in excess of costs
when selling goods at the market price. The term surplus as used here includes not just
producer surplus but consumer surplus as well. Consumer surplus refers to the difference
between the price someone is willing to pay and the price they actually pay. Second,
Ricardo only discusses the producer surplus that arises from owning land, but producer
surplus can arise in many contexts other than land ownership.
80
Surplus, WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1973).
81
Surplus Definition, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/search?q=surplus+definition
&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&client=firefox-b-1 [https://perma.cc/XH44-PAB4].
82
Surplus, supra note 80.
83
Surplus Definition, supra note 81.
84
Surplus as defined above can also arise from the process by which goods and
services are produced, because combining various inputs in a particular manner can create
an output of greater value than the costs of the inputs. One might call the resulting gains in
such a situation “production surplus.” Production surplus so defined has received some
amount of attention from both economists and legal scholars. Most notably, Armen Alchian
and Harold Demsetz show how difficulties in measuring the relative contributions of
various components to the value of a good manufactured by a team could explain why
firms are used to organize productive activities. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz,
Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777
(1972). Alchian and Demsetz do not, however, use the word surplus to describe this
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trade is the difference between the value of the good to the person who receives the
good and the value of the good to the person who is parting with the good.85
The examples of surplus provided in the Introduction can be used to illustrate
how this calculation might work. If someone can purchase a copy of “Hillbilly
Elegy” for only $17 on Amazon even if she would have paid $50 for a copy of the
book, there is at least a $33 surplus in this transaction.86 Likewise, when Gilead
Science charges $100,000 for a twelve-week course of treatment with the drug
Harvoni that only cost Gilead $25,000 to develop and prepare, there is at least a
$75,000 surplus.87
A logical follow-on question is: where does all of this surplus come from?
One source of surplus is heterogeneity (or differences) both between and among
buyers and sellers in a particular market.88 Ricardo recognized that heterogeneity
was the source of the surplus he famously identified as rent.89 In the second chapter
of The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, Ricardo observed that it “is
only, then, because land is not unlimited in quantity and uniform in quality, . . .
phenomenon. For refinements of the Alchian and Demsetz model, see Bengt Holmström,
Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324 (1982) and Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi
Zingales, Power in the Theory of a Firm, 114 Q.J. ECON. 387 (1998).
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout build upon the Alchian and Demsetz insight to argue
that corporate Boards of Directors “exist not to protect shareholders per se, but to protect
the enterprise-specific investments of all the members of the corporate ‘team,’ including
shareholders, managers, rank and file employees, and possibly other groups, such as
creditors.” Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 253 (1999). Blair and Stout do use the term surplus to describe
some part of the team output and note that “serious problems can arise in determining how
any economic surpluses generated by team production – any ‘rents’ – should be divided.”
Id. at 249.
The problem of how to share a surplus fairly and efficiently that arises in the team
production context is different from the surplus problem that arises in market transactions.
Team production involves the creation of value by cooperative endeavor, whereas the
surplus problem in markets involves a situation in which it may be difficult for those on
each side of the transaction to cooperate in order to minimize waste. I do not include a
discussion in this Article of the distinct problems that arise out of production surplus.
85
For simplicity throughout this Article, I refer to transactions as involving goods,
although the transaction could involve any kind of market exchange.
86
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
87
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
88
For illustrative research discussing the role of heterogeneity in the creation of
surplus in the context of fisheries, see Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, Contracting
Problems and Regulation: The Case of the Fishery, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 1005 (1982).
89
Ricardo might rightly be identified as the father of surplus analysis. The only
qualification is that there is some evidence that Ricardo’s ideas about rent originated with
his friend, Thomas Malthus. See, e.g., THOMAS ROBERT MALTHUS, AN INQUIRY INTO THE
NATURE AND PROGRESS OF RENT AND THE PRINCIPLES BY WHICH IT IS REGULATED 7–8
(1815) (“And the inequality of soils occasions, even at an early period of society, a
comparative scarcity of the best lands; and so far is undoubtedly one of the causes of rent
properly called.”).
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that rent is ever paid for the use of it . . . . The amount of that rent will depend on
the difference in the quality of these two portions of land.”90 The person who owns
higher quality land is able to rent her land for more than it cost, because the
fecundity of her land exceeds that of the marginal land farmed, and the market
price is determined by the productivity of the marginal land.
Contrary to the assumptions relied upon by rent-seeking scholars to justify
limiting the scope of their research, this source of surplus, differences between and
among buyers and sellers, is likely to be sustained and pronounced.91 The rents
described by Ricardo illustrate why surplus is likely to be an ongoing rather than
ephemeral feature of a market economy.92 The relative fecundity of one piece of
land as compared to another can persist even in a well-functioning economy. The
persistence of “Ricardian rents”93 also helps to illustrate the difference between
surplus and profit. Ricardian rents are determined by differences between the
productivity of one particular landholder’s land and the productivity of the
marginal piece of land. The skill or effort of the landowner does not determine
how much rent the landowner will receive. As Ricardo correctly observes, “the
laws which regulate the progress of rent are widely different from those which
regulate the progress of profits.”94
Differences between the wealth of buyers are also an important and ongoing
source of heterogeneity and, therefore, surplus in a market economy.95 Consider
the following hypothetical example. A rich person is willing to pay $10 for an ice
cream cone while a poor person is only willing to pay $1 for the same ice cream
cone, even if both would enjoy the cone equally. Despite identical preferences
between the rich and poor purchaser, their difference in wealth creates a surplus if
we assume the price they have to pay is roughly equal. Significant inequality in
wealth in our society has received increasing attention as of late.96 An increase in
90

RICARDO, supra note 53, at 70 (emphasis added).
Many of these differences may, however, be difficult to observe. Jerry A. Hausman
& Whiney K. Newey, Individual Heterogeneity and Average Welfare, 84 ECONOMETRICA
1225, 1225 (2016) (“Unobserved individual heterogeneity is thought to be a large source of
variation in empirical demand equations.”).
92
The possibility of extrapolating from Ricardo’s work and concluding that there are
sustained surpluses throughout the economy was an idea explored over a century ago by
Sidney Webb and the Fabians. A. M. MCBRIAR, FABIAN SOCIALISM & ENGLISH POLITICS:
1884–1918, at 35–41 (1962). For a critique of this extension of Ricardo’s theory of rent by
the Fabians, see George J. Stigler, Sidney Webb, and the Theory of Fabian Socialism, 103
PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 469, 472–75 (1959).
93
The term ‘Ricardian rents’ is used here to refer to the surplus resulting from owning
higher quality land.
94
Id. at 68. A related observation that Ricardo makes is that the amount of rent
received does not affect price. Id. at 78 (“[R]ent is not a component part of the price of
commodities.”).
95
This was implicit in the example above involving the purchase of a book at market
price on Amazon by someone who is wealthy. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
96
For a discussion of wealth inequality in our society, see, e.g., Thomas Piketty &
Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States: 1913–1998, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1
91
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the amount of surplus in the economy is one potential consequence of this
development.
Differences in willingness to pay among purchasers that arise out of wealth
inequality are not only a source of surplus, but also a source of surplus that is
almost certainly distributed in a regressive manner. As Liam Murphy and Thomas
Nagel observe, a “competitive market in private goods therefore automatically
creates a large surplus—the difference between actual price and reserve price—for
people who have lots of money.”97 The ice cream cone hypothetical introduced in
the paragraph above can provide a concrete example of this regressive effect. If the
ice cream cone were to sell for $1, then the poor person purchasing the cone gains
no surplus from the transaction whereas the rich person gets to keep a $9 surplus.
The discussion above highlights how differences between buyers (perhaps
because of wealth differences) and sellers (perhaps because of differences in the
quality of the land they hold) can create a significant amount of surplus even in an
efficiently functioning economy. The implications about the ubiquity and large
amount of surplus in markets that can be inferred from supply and demand curves,
as drawn in introductory microeconomics textbooks, appear to be correct.98
2. Estimated Magnitude
The discussion above clarifies why surplus is a ubiquitous and persistent
market phenomenon. The reason is that there are often differences between the
value of a good to a buyer and the value of that same good to the seller. The next
question to address is how large the amounts involved might be. It is a challenge
beyond the scope of this Article to estimate with precision the amount of surplus in
the United States economy at any given point in time. However, preliminary
estimates offered below suggest that the amounts involved are quite large.
There are several ways to estimate the amount of surplus in the economy. One
approach is to look at corporate profitability generally and then estimate what
share of this profitability arises from the ability of firms to capture surplus as
opposed to other potential sources of profitability. The goal of this approach would
be to separate out “corporate surplus” from the firms’ “ordinary profits,” and then
to infer from the amount of this “corporate surplus” a lower bound on the amount
of surplus in the economy.99 A second approach is to infer how large the surplus
(2003) (using income data to document a sharp rise in the share of income going to the
very top of the distribution in the United States); but see Bruce D. Meyer & James X.
Sullivan, Consumption and Income Inequality in the U.S. since the 1960s 32 (Nat’l Bureau
Economic Research, Working Paper 23655, 2017) (finding “evidence of only a modest rise
in consumption inequality over the past five decades”).
97
Liam Murphy & Thomas Nagel, Taxes, Redistribution, and Public Provision, 30
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 53, 60 (2001).
98
See supra notes 2, 3, and accompanying text.
99
This approach, even if carried out with precision, would underestimate the amount
of surplus in the economy, because surplus captured by other actors in the economy, such
as consumers, would be ignored.
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might be based on the amounts spent to capture surplus. The assumption
underlying this approach would be that firms should be willing to spend up to, but
not more than, the amount of the underlying surplus available for capture. 100 A
third approach is to estimate the amount of surplus in the economy by
extrapolating from evidence of surplus in specific markets.101
I use the first and second approaches here to generate preliminary estimates of
the amount of surplus in the economy. The immediate challenge facing the first
approach—using corporate surplus to estimate overall surplus—is the problem of
how to separate out a firm’s gains from capturing surplus from the firm’s “ordinary
profits.” Changes in corporate profitability over the past forty years provide some
insight into how to accomplish this daunting task, as suggested in research by
economists Jan De Loecker and Jan Eeckhout.102 De Loecker and Eeckhout
investigate the extent to which public companies in the United States have
increased their ability to charge customers prices in excess of cost. Based on
balance sheet data from public companies, De Loecker and Eeckhout estimate that
markups above cost have more than tripled since the 1980s, rising from
approximately 18% of cost in 1980 to 67% above cost currently.103 One
100

For an analysis that challenges this intuition about the likely relationship between
available surplus and expenditures made to capture that surplus, see Gordon Tullock,
Efficient Rent Seeking, in JAMES M. BUCHANAN ET AL., TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENTSEEKING SOCIETY 95–112 (1980).
101
Rory Van Loo uses this third type of analysis to reach the conclusion that the
preliminary data indicates that there is over a trillion dollars of “consumer overcharge
across the economy.” Rory Van Loo, Consumer Law as Tax Alternative (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Van Loo, Consumer Law]; see also, Rory
Van Loo, Helping Buyers Beware: The Need for Supervision of Big Retail, 163 U. PA. L.
REV. 1311, 1355 (2015) (observing that in the retail goods sector alone the leading study
would imply overcharge for a family earning $50,000 annually is between $600 and $1,200
annually).
Much of what Van Loo describes as overcharge would be characterized as a
component of surplus in the analytical framework developed here. Van Loo is, however,
calculating an amount that differs from the amount under investigation here in several
ways. First, Van Loo is interested in identifying the amount of surplus consumers lose to
sellers, whereas the analysis here is concerned with the total amount of surplus in the
economy regardless of whether purchasers are consumers or businesses. Second, the
surplus under consideration here includes the amount traditionally labeled producer
surplus, which is the amount sellers receive in excess of their reservation price. Van Loo
does not include producer surplus in his calculation. Third, Van Loo includes in his
estimate amounts that consumers pay in excess of their true “willingness to pay” as a result
of either “behavioral overcharge” or deceptive practices. My goal in estimating surplus is
to exclude these amounts, because they represent something other than an unambiguous
economic surplus.
102
Jan De Loecker & Jan Eeckhout, The Rise of Market Power and the
Macroeconomics Implications 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
23687, 2017).
103
Id. at 16.
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explanation for this change is that these firms are able to capture more surplus than
they were forty years ago.104
If the higher markups De Loecker and Eeckhout observe result from an
increase in the ability of public firms to capture surplus, then increases in firm
profitability in the overall economy during this period might help to estimate the
aggregate amount of surplus in the economy. According to an analysis by the
Federal Reserve Bank (the “FED”), corporate after tax profits in the United States
increased from $1.4 trillion in 1986 to more than $6.7 trillion in 2016.105 The
increase in markups observed among public firms by De Loecker and Eeckhout
likely explains some amount of the dramatic increase in the profitability of United
States corporations observed by the FED over the same period.106 Even using
conservative assumptions, this increase in corporate profits since the 1980s
suggests that the aggregate amount of surplus in the United States economy in a
given year is at least $2.5 trillion.107
A second way to estimate the amount of surplus in the economy is to consider
the amount of money spent to capture surplus. Presumably, the amount spent to
capture surplus may approach but will not exceed the actual amount of surplus.108
One possible indication of the amount spent to capture surplus is spending on
media advertising, because media advertising is one way firms can differentiate
their products and avoid selling their goods at the market-clearing price. Over $200
104

De Loecker and Eeckhout consider but reject reasons other than increased market
power to explain why markups have increased so dramatically since 1980. Id. at 14–16. But
see TAD LIPSKY ET AL., GLOBAL ANTITRUST INSTITUTE, ANTONIN SCALIA LAW SCHOOL,
GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY LAW & ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER SERIES 18-25, THE
UNITED STATES FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION HEARINGS ON COMPETITION AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE 21ST CENTURY, HEARING ON CONCENTRATION AND
COMPETITIVENESS IN THE U.S. ECONOMY (2018).
105
Corporate Profits After Tax (without IVA and CCAdj), ECON. RES., FED. RES.
BANK ST. LOUIS (Sept. 20, 2017), https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CP [https://perma.cc/N7
V8-4HBG]. The 1986 dollar amount reported above ($1.4 trillion) is adjusted for inflation
and stated in 2016 dollars. The use of United States firm profitability data to estimate
United States surplus may be problematic to the extent that these profits arise from
transactions that take place outside of the United States.
106
De Loecker and Eeckhout only analyze public firms because those are the only
firms for which the relevant financial data is available, but public firms in the United States
control a substantial share of the country’s economic activity (for example, over 40% of
firm sales). De Loecker & Eeckhout, supra note 102; John A. Asker et al., Corporate
Investment and Stock Market Listing: A Puzzle?, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 342, 345 (2014).
107
I assume half (50%) of the roughly $5 trillion increase in after-tax profits is
attributable to the increased ability of firms to capture surplus observed by De Loecker and
Eeckhout during this period, that there is no surplus in the economy prior to this period or
arising from any other sources, and that tax rates are zero (the FED only reports after tax
profits).
108
See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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billion is spent annually on media advertising in the United States.109 A speculative
extrapolation from these annual expenditures suggests that surplus in the United
States economy is at least $2.0 trillion annually.110
Two methods for generating preliminary estimates of the magnitude of
surplus in the United States economy on an annual basis suggest that the minimum
amounts involved are at least $2.0 trillion or $2.5 trillion. Further work will need
to be done to refine these estimates, but this preliminary work shows that the
surplus in our economy is quite likely a large economic phenomenon.
One reason rent-seeking scholars offer for limiting their concerns about the
relationship between waste and surplus to government-created monopoly rights is
the assumption that surplus is not a particularly significant phenomenon in markets
generally.111 The estimates provided above show that this assumption does not
provide a sound justification for ignoring costs incurred in the fight for surplus
throughout the economy.
3. Growing Importance
The discussion above suggests that surplus in the United States economy is a
ubiquitous and economically significant phenomenon. A related and important
observation is that the battle for this surplus is entering a new and more
competitive phase.
More than a century ago, with the increased use of price tags, a truce in the
battle for surplus emerged between retail buyers and sellers.112 The practice of
109

This estimate is provided by Statista, an online statistics aggregating site. Media
Advertising Spending in the United States from 2015 to 2022 (in Billion U.S. Dollars),
STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/272314/advertising-spending-in-the-us/
[https://perma.cc/UD9G-RM6F]. Another data point comes from Akerlof and Shiller, who
estimate funds spent on advertising at $280 billion in 2007. GEORGE A. AKERLOF &
ROBERT J. SHILLER, PHISHING FOR PHOOLS: THE ECONOMICS OF MANIPULATION AND
DECEPTION 195 (2015).
110
If perhaps fifty percent (50%) of this annual amount of $200 billion is directed
toward capturing surplus, this would translate into $100 billion in annual media spending to
capture surplus. To extrapolate from the annual amount of media spending to the amount of
surplus in the economy, a multiple of between five and fifty times the annual expenditure
could take into account the fact that the observed expenditures are likely to only marginally
influence the amount of market surplus captured, and represent only one avenue of
spending used to capture surplus. If we use a multiple of twenty times the amount of media
expenditures spent and assume there are no other sources of surplus in the economy, the
implied surplus value is $2.0 trillion.
111
See supra notes 67, 71, and accompanying text.
112
French sociologist Gabriel Tarde is credited with describing the practice of posting
prices as akin to a “military truce” between buyers and sellers. See, e.g., HERMANN SIMON,
CONFESSIONS OF THE PRICING MAN 25 (2015). In some circumstances, such as when the
amount of each individual transaction is comparatively large—for example, when you
purchase a car—the term truce only applies loosely. Anita Ramasastry, Web Sites Change
Prices Based on Customers’ Habits, CNN (June 24, 2005), http://www.cnn.com/2005/LA
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posting prices at retail outlets became widespread as part of a revolution in retail
practices engineered by entrepreneurs, such as Rowland Macy and John
Wanamaker.113 These entrepreneurs realized that displaying prices would limit
their ability to charge higher prices to customers who were willing to pay more.
However, they recognized that posting prices would also provide significant cost
savings. One commentator observes:
Merchants saw the practical benefits of Macy’s and Wanamaker’s
prix fixe policies. As they staffed up their new department stores, it was
expensive to train hundreds of clerks in the art of haggling. Fixed prices
offered a measure of predictability to bookkeeping, sped up the sales
process, and made possible the proliferation of printed retail ads
highlighting a given price for a given good.114
Customers also appear to prefer not to have to haggle over price.115 These
pioneering retailers realized that, given the economies of the day, it was worth
sacrificing the opportunity to capture additional surplus because of the benefits in
terms of selling efficiencies, reduced marketing costs, and enhanced customer
goodwill provided by posting prices.
However, this historic truce between retail buyers and sellers, in place for
more than a century, is breaking down. With the advent of online markets and “big
data,” companies are moving toward personalized pricing and other sophisticated
pricing techniques.116 New technologies now allow firms to modify prices almost
instantaneously and based on who the purchaser is. These technologies therefore
enable sellers to capture a greater share of the surplus then when prices were more
costly to change.117 Consumers are fighting back with price comparison
W/06/24/ramasastry.website.prices/ [https://perma.cc/2694-6BPV] (“And everyone knows
that the ‘sticker’ price on a car is not the typical purchase price. It serves, rather, as a
starting point for further negotiation.”).
113
Jerry Useem, How Online Shopping Makes Suckers of Us All, ATLANTIC, May
2017. The credo at Wanamaker’s store, for example, was “One price to all; no favoritism.”
Id.
114
Id.
115
See Saul Levmore & Frank Fagan, The End of Bargaining in the Digital Age, 103
CORNELL L. REV. 1469, 1479 (2018) (“In modern times, it is a process that many amateurs
seek to avoid, even if it means forgoing bargains, because they recognize that a reluctant or
inept participant is sure to pay too high a price . . . .”).
116
As Oren Bar-Gill explains, “we are approaching a world[] where each consumer
will be charged a personalized price for a personalized product or service.” Oren Bar-Gill,
Algorithmic Price Discrimination: When Demand Is a Function of Both Preferences and
(Mis)perceptions, U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at i).
117
See supra note 113; Adam Tanner, Different Customers, Different Prices, Thanks
to Big Data, FORBES (Apr. 14, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/adamtanner/2014/03/26
/different-customers-different-prices-thanks-to-big-data/#2a3d0d905730 [https://perma.cc/
5N67-MMS5]. One study applying “big data” techniques found that using an individual’s
browsing history to personalize prices could increase profits by over 12%. Benjamin Reed
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technologies.118 The result of these developments is that the battle between
consumers and retailers for surplus is escalating anew.
One reason rent-seeking scholars did not extend their powerful insight about
the relationship between surplus and waste to market transactions was their belief
that surplus was a minor and ephemeral feature of a well-functioning market.119
The analysis above shows why such a view is mistaken. Surplus is a ubiquitous,
large, and increasingly important phenomenon even in “well-ordered” markets.
C. Surplus, Investment, and Innovation
Another assumption rent-seeking scholars offer for ignoring the ramifications
of their insight about the relationship between waste and surplus to the broader
economy is their assumption that unfettered markets are likely to distribute surplus
in a way that leads to desirable levels of investment and innovation.120 This section
shows that the relationship between unregulated competition for surplus and
socially desirable levels of investment or innovation is more complex and
ambiguous than this simplifying assumption implies.
To illustrate why unregulated markets may or may not be the best way to
distribute surplus—if the goal is to achieve efficient levels of investment or
innovation—it is helpful to consider several possible scenarios. Considering these
scenarios makes clear that there is no reason to believe a priori that relying on
markets will result in desirable levels of investment or innovation. The flaw with
this reliance is that market forces cannot distinguish between situations in which
capturing surplus offers an appropriate reward for welfare-enhancing investments
and situations in which the opportunity to capture surplus triggers investment in a
wasteful arms race.121
The first scenarios to consider are those in which the method used to
distribute a surplus, whether by market competition or otherwise, will have no
effect on the level of investment or innovation. For example, if there are a
multitude of viable competitors in an industry and entry and exit into that industry
is relatively easy, then the relationship between marginal costs and the price at
which goods are sold will determine incentives to invest. Investment decisions in
Shiller, First-Degree Price Discrimination Using Big Data (Apr. 9, 2014) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the author).
118
Sites such as www.pricegrabber.com and www.shopzilla.com empower consumers
by reducing search costs.
119
See supra notes 67, 71, and accompanying text.
120
See supra notes 68, 74, and accompanying text.
121
For a similar observation in the context of evaluating the social welfare effects of
copyright law, see Meurer, Copyright Law, supra note 12, at 66 (“The critical issue is
whether the extra profit from price discrimination stimulates excessive investment or
ameliorates an inadequate productive incentive.”). For a similar observation in the context
of evaluating the social welfare effects of information gathering activities, see Jack
Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive
Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561 (1971).
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this scenario will not be affected by how surplus is distributed, because who does
or does not receive surplus will not affect how the marginal firm’s investment
decision is made.122 This is the industry structure foreseen by Ricardo when he
observes that the lands to be used for farming and the market price will not vary
even if one changes who receives rent from the land. As Ricardo concludes about
such a scenario, if “landlords should forgo the whole of their rent . . . [s]uch a
measure would only enable some farmers to live like gentlemen, but would not
diminish the quantity of labor necessary to raise raw produce on the least
productive land in cultivation.”123
Another situation in which the way a surplus is allocated will not affect
investment decisions is when the surplus arises out of an unexpected windfall. As
Eric Kades observes, “[s]ocietal capture of windfalls, by definition, does not affect
incentives to engage in productive activity and therefore does not discourage effort
or exercise.”124 Finally, if the setting is one in which no long term investments are
made, then the impact on investment levels of alternative surplus sharing
arrangements can be ignored. These various scenarios illustrate situations wherein
the way in which surplus is allocated will not affect the amount of investment or
innovation in the economy.
However, in other situations, the way in which surplus is allocated will affect
the amount of investment or innovation in the economy. The question that proves
to be more difficult to answer than rent-seeking scholars assume is whether these
effects, if left unregulated, are predictably more or less likely to increase social
welfare. To facilitate the analysis, the effects of unregulated surplus allocation on
investment levels are considered first, followed by a discussion of the effects of
unregulated surplus allocation on innovation.
1. Investment
Two closely related scenarios involving the construction of a movie theater in
a small town illustrate how difficult it is to know a priori how surplus should be
allocated, if the goal is to achieve desirable investment levels.
In the first of this pair of scenarios, let us assume that a decision is about to be
made as to whether to build a movie theater in a small, remote town. Further,
assume that this is a one-movie-theater town. This means in this context that the
social welfare gains from building the movie theater just exceed the costs of
building and running the theater. If a firm considers building a movie theater in
this one-movie-theater town, but that firm will not be able to capture much of the
surplus this investment will create—perhaps because regulations require charging
122

PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 2, at 301 (“[T]he long-run output of a profitmaximizing competitive firm is the point at which long-run marginal cost equals the
[market] price.”) (emphasis omitted).
123
RICARDO, supra note 53, at 75. Ricardo is referring to a redistribution proposal
Malthus considers wherein “the landlords were to give the whole of their rents to their
tenants.” MALTHUS, supra note 89, at 57.
124
Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489, 1492 (1999).
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the same price for every ticket—it might not build a movie theater even though
doing so would have increased aggregate social welfare.
If, however, this same firm is able to capture more of the value the new movie
theater creates—perhaps by implementing the types of price discrimination
practices typically employed in the movie theater industry, such as reducing prices
for senior citizens or offering lower prices at matinee times—the movie theater
would be built.125 In this one-movie-theater town scenario, market dynamics that
allow the seller to capture more of the surplus would lead to the socially optimal
investment decision.
It is this type of scenario, where prohibiting price discrimination will cause
underinvestment, that leads many scholars to conclude that a prohibition on
surplus-capturing practices such as price discrimination is unwise.126 This is not a
new insight. Pigou, for example, noted the possibility of a beneficial relationship
between price discrimination and investment. He wrote:
Finally, it should be observed that, when conditions of decreasing supply
prevail, monopoly plus discrimination of the first degree may increase
the size of the national dividend in a more special way. It may bring
about a considerable amount of socially desirable investment in an
industry, in which, under a regime of simple competition, it would not
have been in anybody’s interest to make an investment at all.127
However, a second scenario that is quite similar to the scenario just described
above would lead to the opposite conclusion. In this second scenario, we alter our
one-movie-theater town example from above slightly so that there is now sufficient
surplus available to entice not one, but two companies to open a movie theater in
the same small town.128 We also assume that from a social welfare perspective the
preferred outcome would be to build just one theater because with the opening of a
second theater the surplus provided by opening the first theater would be fully
dissipated.129
In this second scenario, where there is sufficient surplus to entice two
companies to enter the movie-theater market in this small town, prohibiting price
discrimination would provide better long-term incentives than would permitting
price discrimination to proceed unfettered. This is opposite of the policy
125

For a more detailed discussion of price discrimination, see infra Subsection II.B.3.
See, e.g., William J. Baumol & Daniel G. Swanson, The New Economy and
Ubiquitous Competitive Price Discrimination: Identifying Defensible Criteria of Market
Power, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 661, 680 (2003); Edwards, supra note 12, at 586.
127
PIGOU, supra note 39, at 283 (emphasis omitted).
128
To keep comparability between the situations where there is one versus two
theaters in this small town, it makes sense to assume that each movie theater is a multiplex
that can show an unlimited selection of movies.
129
In this second scenario, building the second theater destroys value just as in
Posner’s description of a situation where too many ships from a social welfare perspective
chase after salvage opportunities. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
126

634

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 3

prescription with respect to price discrimination in the first scenario considered
above.130 Comparing these two small town movie-theater scenarios illustrates that
allowing firms to capture surplus might provide appropriate incentives for
investments, or that doing so might encourage wasteful competition for surplus.
There is no way to know a priori which scenario is more realistic.
In summary, permitting unfettered competition for surplus need not lead to
socially desirable levels of investment. In some circumstances, allowing market
participants to fight for and capture surplus will provide the needed incentive to
invest wisely. In other circumstances, limiting the extent to which sellers can fight
for and capture surplus will lead to optimal investment levels. There are also
situations, such as when markets are competitive or when surplus constitutes an
unexpected windfall, where investment levels are unaffected by how surplus is
divvied up among market participants.131 It is a mistake, as scholars studying rentseeking do, to limit investigation of the relationship between surplus and waste to
competition for government-created monopoly rights, because of faith in the
magical power of well-functioning markets to settle upon arrangements that lead to
an optimal level of investment without regulatory intervention.
2. Innovation
Innovation is the process by which new technology is developed,132 and it
represents an important source of economic growth.133 However, as with the
effects of differing market conditions on whether unfettered competition leads to
socially desirable investment levels, the effects of unfettered competition on
incentives to innovate are context-specific and hard to predict a priori. It is,
therefore, again, a mistake to assume, as scholars who study rent-seeking do, that a
laissez-faire approach to surplus allocation will lead to optimal levels of
innovation.
On the one hand, market conditions and legal rules that allow an innovator to
capture the entire amount of the surplus created by an innovation will encourage
more investment in innovation.134 However, the possibility also exists that
130

See supra notes 125 to 127 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 122 to 124 and accompanying text.
132
See, e.g., Dan Usher, The Welfare Economics of Invention, 31 ECONOMICA 279
(1964).
133
Michael A. Carrier, Resolving the Patent-Antitrust Paradox Through Tripartite
Innovation, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1047, 1060–61 & nn.63–67 (2003) (citing sources
showing that “innovative efficiencies dwarf t h o se derived from maximizing allocative
efficiency and that innovation is the most important factor in the growth of the
economy”); Heidi L. Williams, How Do Patents Affect Research Investment? ANN. REV.
ECON. 441, 442 (2017) (“Technological change is widely perceived to be a key driver of
improved standards of living.”).
134
Based on the logic that rewards from innovation should go as much as possible to
the innovator, Joseph Schumpeter famously argued that monopoly was the ideal structure
for spurring innovation, because the monopolist could capture more of the gains from
131

2019]

LAW AND SURPLUS

635

investments in innovation can generate private but not social gains. As Professor
Glenn Loury explains:
if entry is again costless and occurs until no firm expects positive profit
in equilibrium, more firms will enter the innovation race than is socially
optimal. In any market structure, competing firms invest more in R&D
than would be optimal because they do not take account of the parallel
nature of their efforts.135
The difficulty in determining how to share surplus in order to optimize
investments in innovation is similar to challenges faced in attempting to design an
optimal patent system. The primary justification for the patent system and the grant
of temporary monopoly power it provides to innovators is that protection from
competition enhances returns to innovation. In theory, these protections can “bring
the private returns captured by inventors closer to the social value of their
inventions.”136 However, these monopoly grants also create a prize that many
would-be innovators chase after without regard to the waste associated with the
competition for surplus. Just as it is difficult to know with any certainty if the
patent system is properly calibrated, it is implausible that one could conclude
without careful investigation that leaving the distribution of surplus to markets will
lead to an optimal level of innovation.137
innovation. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 106
(1942).
Schumpeter’s conjecture was challenged by Kenneth Arrow who argued that only in a
competitive market would companies have a sufficient incentive to innovate and replace
existing products. Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 619 (R.R. Nelson ed.,
1962). But see J. Gregory Sidak & David J. Teece, Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law,
5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 581, 589 (2009) (“In fact, it is important to note that despite
how Arrow’s article is usually interpreted (to claim that competition spurs innovation), his
general position in his writings is, much like Schumpeter’s, that competitive markets
provide inadequate incentives for firms to innovate.”).
A significant amount of investigation by economists has failed to resolve the debate
between Schumpeter and Arrow about the optimal conditions for spurring innovation. For a
review of this debate, see Michael A. Carrier, Two Puzzles Resolved: Of the SchumpeterArrow Stalemate and Pharmaceutical Innovation Markets, 93 IOWA L. REV. 393, 403–10
(2008). For a conclusion as to who won the debate, see Sidak & Teece, supra, at 586
(“Indeed, we believe that the debate over whether to favor competition over monopoly (as
the market structure most likely to advance innovation) was won long ago in favor of some
form of rivalry or competition.”).
135
Glenn C. Loury, Market Structure and Innovation, 93 Q.J. ECON. 397, 408–09
(1979).
136
Williams, supra note 133, at 442.
137
See, e.g., id. at 464–65 (“[G]iven the limitations of the existing literature, we still
have essentially no credible empirical evidence on the seemingly simple question of
whether stronger patent rights . . . encourage research investment into developing new
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Rent-seeking scholars did not explore the implications of their insight that
surplus invites waste to the broader economy. Their justifications for restricting
investigation of the link between surplus and waste to the competition for
government-created monopoly rights are: (1) that surplus is a minor and ephemeral
economic phenomenon;138 and (2) that a laissez-faire approach to surplus sharing
will provide incentives for socially efficient levels of investment and innovation.139
These justifications for limiting their investigation are ill-founded. Surplus in
markets is a ubiquitous, economically significant, and increasingly important
phenomenon. Nor is there good reason to assume, without further investigation,
that a laissez-faire approach to surplus sharing is the best way to provide incentives
for investment or innovation. Rent-seeking scholars missed an opportunity to
explore and expand our understanding of the links between law, markets, and
surplus.
II. SURPLUS PROBLEM DENIAL IN LAW AND ECONOMICS SCHOLARSHIP
This Part investigates the failure of law and economics scholars to address
fully the role legal rules can play in ameliorating the surplus problem. Unlike the
scholars who study rent-seeking, law and economics scholars do not offer explicit
justifications for avoidance of this topic. However, it is possible to discern four
assumptions that have led law and economics scholars to allow this oversight to
persist.
A. Fragmented Exploration of Law and Surplus
Before examining in detail the reasons why law and economics scholars have
failed to investigate fully legal solutions to the surplus problem, it is helpful to
consider briefly some of the ways legal rules might offer some assistance.140 Such
a review suggests how intriguing the unexplored questions might be, an
technologies.”).
One effort to take into account both the positive externalities that result from private
expenditures on research and development as well as social costs from overinvestment does
conclude that there is “under-investment in R&D, with socially optimal level being over
twice as high as the level of observed R&D.” Nicholas Bloom et al., Identifying
Technology Spillovers and Product Market Rivalry, 81 ECONOMETRICA 1347, 1349 (2013).
138
See supra notes 67, 71, and accompanying text.
139
See supra notes 68, 74, and accompanying text.
140
Other research that addresses the question of optimal surplus sharing in legal
scholarship not discussed in the text below includes: (1) research on litigation expenses,
see, e.g., Farmer & Pecorino, supra note 9; (2) research on the costs of haggling, see, e.g.,
Levmore & Fagan, supra note 115; and (3) research on the behavior of managers of public
companies, see, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 62 (2004); Aaron S. Edlin & Joseph E.
Stiglitz, Discouraging Rivals: Managerial Rent-Seeking and Economic Inefficiencies, 85
AM. ECON. REV. 1301 (1995).
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observation that is especially important given the ubiquity, magnitude, and
growing importance of surplus outlined above.141 Such a review also provides an
opportunity to highlight those rare instances where law and economics scholars
have grappled with how legal rules can address the surplus problem.
Legal rules already do address the surplus problem in a number of ways.
Some examples come from property law. Certain property rules appear to be
specifically designed to allocate found property in ways that reduce wasteful
competition for surplus.142 The rule of salvage in admiralty law is one example.
The rule of salvage dictates how to allocate goods rescued by a salver, and dates
back to antiquity.143 This rule provides that “persons by whose voluntary assistance
a ship at sea or her cargo or both have been saved in whole or in part from
impending sea peril, or in recovering such property from actual peril or loss, as in
cases of shipwreck” receives if, and only if, the rescue is successful, an amount
somewhat greater than the cost of rescue.144 If there is additional surplus remaining
after the salver is compensated, that surplus goes to the original owner of the
property.
Richard Posner offers the following simple and powerful numeric example to
illustrate how the rule of salvage addresses the potential for wasteful competition
to be the first ship to carry out a rescue at sea.145 Posner writes:
Suppose the sunken treasure is worth $1 million and it will cost $250,000
to hire a team of divers to raise it. Because the expected profit of the
venture is so high, someone else may decide to hire his own team to try
and beat the first team to it. A third and even a fourth team may try, too,
for if each one has the same chance (25 percent) of reaching the treasure
first, the expected value of the venture to each one ($1 million x .25) will
still cover the expected cost of each. If all four try, however, the cost of
141

See supra Sections I.B. and I.C.
See generally Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, The Race for Property Rights, 33
J.L. & ECON. 177 (1990) (considering aspects of property law that can be understood as
efforts to minimize the waste that might otherwise arise from competition for surplus).
Andersson and Hill conclude in a subsequent article that there is not one simple rule that
can mitigate this potential source of waste. Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, Cowboys
and Contracts, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 489, 490 (2002) (“Some law and economics scholars
contend that the rent dissipation resulting from open access can be mitigated by commonlaw rules of first possession such as those that apply to abandoned property, adverse
possession, oil and gas, and the spoils of way. The race to be first, however, also consumes
valuable resources and can diminish the gain from privatization and possibly dissipate it
completely.” (citations omitted)). See also Lueck, supra note 52 (explaining how different
types of first possession rules can help to minimize rent dissipation).
143
3A BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY §§ 2 (Martin J. Norris ed., 7th ed. 1997) (citations
omitted); GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 559–74
(2d ed. 1975). For a discussion of the precedents in antiquity for this rule see 3A BENEDICT
ON ADMIRALTY, supra, at § 1.
144
3A BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, supra note 143, at §§ 2, 235–44.
145
POSNER, supra note 2, at 45.
142
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obtaining the treasure, $1 million, will be four times what it would have
been had only one tried.146
With this example, Posner shows how a legal rule granting the total value of
the find to the salver, instead of the admiralty law rule of salvage, would cause “an
expected gain to be translated into costs through competitive efforts.”147
However, Posner does little more with this important insight about how welldesigned legal rules can address the surplus problem. Posner observes that the
“trend in the common law is to expand the escheat principle of treasure trove into
other areas of found property and thus give the finder a reward rather than the
property itself; this makes economic sense.”148 This is not a particularly ambitious
application of this important insight.
The one exception to Posner’s limited application of his insight about law,
surplus, and waste, comes in his discussion of the race to patent an invention.
Posner writes that “[n]othing might seem more remote from sunken treasure than
patented inventions, and yet the economic problem created by patents is
remarkably like that of abandoned property. Ideas are in a sense created but in
another sense found.”149 Posner acknowledges this parallel, but does not offer a
legal rule to address the potential for wasteful overinvestment in the race to be the
first to patent an invention.150
Laws that restrict pricing practices, such as restrictions on price
discrimination, provide another example of a way in which legal rules can address
the surplus problem.151 One example of such a law is the Robinson-Patman Act.152
The Robinson-Patman Act “prohibits price discrimination between the purchasers
of commodities of like grade or quality that are likely to result in substantial injury
146

Id. (footnote omitted). As for the likelihood this hypothetical would occur in
practice, the particular conditions under which this type of value dissipation will occur is a
complex issue for which there is no easy resolution. See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 77–78 (1988) (“One cannot a priori measure rent
dissipation without going into the microfoundations of the particular situation. . . . Only a
carful description of the rent-seeking game can allow us to give an order of magnitude for
this [dissipation].”) (footnote omitted).
147
POSNER, supra note 2, at 45 n.4. Another solution to this problem suggested by an
economist is to require the rescuer to pay “other contestants for the lost values of the
prospect”; Dale T. Mortensen, Property Rights and Efficiency in Mating, Racing, and
Related Games, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 968, 969 (1982).
148
POSNER, supra note 2, at 45 (emphasis added).
149
Id. at 47. Others had previously modeled a similar dynamic that arose in efforts to
innovate. See, e.g., Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REV. ECON. & STAT.
348, 348 (1968) (showing how “the excessive use of resources takes the form of their
premature application” in the innovation domain).
150
In contrast, Mark Grady and Jay Alexander do explore trade-offs and potential
solutions to the surplus problem in the patent law context in some detail. See Grady &
Alexander, supra note 52, at 310–316 (1992).
151
For a more in-depth discussion of price discrimination, see infra Subsection II.B.3.
152
15 U.S.C. §13 2(a) (2018).
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to competition.”153 It should be noted that the Robinson-Patman Act is legislation
that most antitrust scholars abhor.154 However, the Robinson-Patman Act does
illustrate how legal rules can be used to engage directly with how surplus is
allocated in certain market transactions by restricting pricing practices, such as
price discrimination.
Other laws affect surplus allocation through the regulation of pricing
practices, but do so less directly than the Robinson-Patman Act. For example, the
ability to capture surplus by means of price discrimination is significantly
constrained when sellers are required to display prices prominently.155 A number
of consumer protection laws require this type of pricing disclosure. One example is
a law in California that requires gasoline stations to display prominently and in
large type how much they charge for a gallon of gas.156 Someone driving into a gas
station in California in a Mercedes can purchase gas for the same price as someone
153

Id. Cf. D. Daniel Sokol, Analyzing Robinson-Patman, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
2064, 2065 (2015) (“The Robinson-Patman Act bans price discrimination, or more
precisely, differential pricing.”). The effective reach of the Robinson-Patman prohibition
on price discrimination is quite limited in practice, because the prohibition only applies to
transactions that involve “the price the manufacturer sets for wholesale sales to its dealers,”
and only when the transaction involves the sale of “commodities” that are “of like grade
and quality.” PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST
LAW 5, 48 (4th ed. 2011) (footnote omitted).
154
See, e.g., Thomas W. Ross, Winners and Losers Under the Robinson-Patman Act,
27 J.L. & ECON. 243, 243 (1984) (“The Robinson-Patman (R-P) Act has the distinction of
being almost universally unpopular among antitrust scholars.”). These scholars point to,
among other things, the fact that the Robinson-Patman Act was an effort to protect an
industry – small local retailers – from competition. Daniel J. Gifford, How Do the Social
Benefits and Cots of the Patent System Stack Up in Pharmaceuticals?, 12 J. INTELL. PROP.
L. 75, 113 (2004) (“Later, in 1936, Congress expanded Section Two in the RobinsonPatman Act in order to protect small retailers from aggressive price-cutting by chain stores
who were able to secure their supplies at discriminatorily-favorable prices.”); Sokol, supra
note 153, at 2069–70 (noting that the original title of the Robinson-Patman Act was the
“Wholesale Grocer’s Protection Act.”).
155
Of course, public disclosure eliminates price discrimination only to the extent that
the disclosed prices are not contingent on product or customer differences. One example of
publicly disclosed prices that still allow for price discrimination are railroad carrying
charges that specify different charges for different types of goods, even when the costs of
carrying those goods are comparable. Andrew Odlyzko, The Evolution of Price
Discrimination and Its Implications for the Internet, 3 REV. NETWORK ECON. 323, 334–35
(2004).
156
CAL. BUS. & PROF. § 13531–32 (West 2018) (requiring that each numeral in the
price be “no less than six inches in height and of uniform size and color” and that the price
information “be clearly visible from each street of the intersection.”). This regulation does
not, of course, prevent price discrimination by selling different grades of gasoline at the
same station or by charging different prices at different gas stations, a practice which oil
companies appear to have perfected. See Alexei Barrionuevo, Secret Formulas Set Prices
for Gasoline, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 20, 2000, 12:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB95
3506880961584494 [https://perma.cc/QV7Z-FMHV].
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driving into that same station driving a Kia.157 If gas stations were not required to
prominently post prices, the result might be different.
Taxes are another approach that can be used to reduce wasteful competition
for surplus. For example, a tax could be imposed on transactions that are more
likely to involve competition for surplus than welfare-enhancing exchange to
discourage wasteful competition. This is presumably the rationale for the longgestating proposal that a small tax be imposed on securities markets
transactions.158
These examples, from property law,159 the rule of salvage in admiralty law,160
direct and indirect restrictions on price discrimination,161 and certain tax
proposals,162 suggest various ways legal rules can address the surplus problem.
This review also covers some of the limited steps law and economics scholars have
taken to understand better law’s role in sharing surplus fairly and efficiently, such
as Posner’s analysis of the rule of salvage.163 A full exploration of how legal rules
can address the surplus problem is beyond the scope of this Article. The limited
aim of the discussion above is to show both that there are interesting legal issues
raised by the ubiquity of surplus in the economy, and to highlight the limited
degree to which law and economics scholars have engaged with these issues.
B. Justifications for Law and Surplus Avoidance and Their Shortcomings
Discerning why law and economics scholars have avoided questions related to
law and surplus is more difficult than in the case of the rent-seeking scholars.
Rent-seeking scholars were explicit about why they chose to limit the scope of
their investigation into the links between surplus and waste.164 Law and economics
scholars do not offer a comparable justification for carrying out such a limited
investigation into how legal rules can address the surplus problem.
In lieu of an explicit justification, one might guess as to what the underlying
implicit assumptions are that these scholars rely on to justify limiting their
investigation into how legal rules can address the surplus problem. There appear to
be four assumptions that have led law and economics scholars to avoid this topic.
These assumptions are: (1) that private parties will negotiate around legal
interventions designed to alter surplus sharing arrangements;165 (2) that it is
unethical to use legal rules to alter surplus sharing arrangements mutually agreed
157

Assuming both drivers purchase the same grade of gasoline.
See, e.g., Jared Bernstein, The Case for a Tax on Financial Transactions, N.Y.
TIMES (July 22, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/22/opinion/the-case-for-a-taxon-financial-transactions.html [https://perma.cc/2DNG-22GT].
159
See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
160
See supra notes 143 through 148 and accompanying text.
161
See supra notes 151 through 157 and accompanying text.
162
See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
163
See supra notes 145 to 147 and accompanying text.
164
See supra notes 55 through 74 and accompanying text.
165
See infra Subsection II.B.1.
158
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upon by private actors;166 (3) that mixed findings about the social welfare effects of
price discrimination show that it is a hopeless exercise to devise rules to allocate
surplus fairly and efficiently;167 and (4) that it is a mistake to include fairness
concerns when considering legal solutions to the surplus problem.168
Each of these assumptions and why they are unconvincing is discussed next.
1. Uselessness of Legal Intervention
One reason legal scholars, including law and economics scholars, might show
little interest in the relationship between law and surplus could be that these
scholars assume that legal rules designed to alter how surplus is divvied up will be
ineffectual. If legal rules will not affect the allocation of surplus, then there is less
reason to study the subject in detail. One can construct both a general argument
and a specific argument as to why legal rules might prove to be ineffectual when it
comes to determining how private parties ultimately allocate surplus.
The all-important Coase Theorem provides the starting point for a general
argument about why legal rules might not have a significant effect on surplus
sharing arrangements. The Coase Theorem holds that when transaction costs are
sufficiently low, assets will be utilized in an efficient manner regardless of how
legal entitlements are initially distributed.169 One implication of the Coase
Theorem is that, at least with respect to how assets are utilized, legal rules are
largely irrelevant in certain circumstances. A general argument about law’s
irrelevance to surplus sharing arrangements could be constructed as a corollary to
the Coase Theorem. The claim would be that legal rules do not alter how surplus is
shared just as they do not alter how assets are utilized in many circumstances.
However, there are several reasons why a rule akin to the Coase Theorem
would not apply when legal rules are used to address the surplus problem. For the
Coase Theorem to apply two preconditions need to be met. First, transaction costs
must be sufficiently low that parties can bargain to reach an efficient use of
resources regardless of legal entitlements. Second, the situation needs to be one in
which the distributional effects of altering legal entitlements can be ignored.
Neither of these preconditions are likely to be met when legal rules are
implemented to share surplus in a more fair and efficient manner.
First, transaction costs are rarely minimal when attempting to share surplus.
Not only are one party’s interests diametrically opposed to the other in the fight for
surplus, but also there are few easily accessible mechanisms to reconcile these
competing interests. For example, competitors who want to cooperate to share
surplus might face antitrust problems as well as other challenges inherent in
competing in what is truly a zero-sum game. One of the surprising but robust
results from research on auctions and negotiations is that even in the best of
166

See infra Subsection II.B.2.
See infra Subsection II.B.3.
168
See infra Subsection II.B.4.
169
Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960).
167
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circumstances there is no guaranteed way to assure that trade will occur simply
because mutual gains would be realized by trade.170
The second precondition for acceptance of the Coase Theorem claim about
law’s irrelevance—that the distributional consequences of changes in legal
entitlements can be ignored—also does not hold in the law and surplus context. In
the context of figuring out how to divvy up a surplus, distributional effects are
likely to be paramount.171 Rawls, for example, argues that any surplus arising out
of market transactions should be distributed to those who are least well off.172 A
corollary to the Coase Theorem arguing that legal rules are irrelevant is unlikely to
apply to legal rules addressing the surplus problem both because the surplus
problem involves situations where transaction costs are high and because
distributional effects are central to the analysis.
A presumption that legal rules are generally irrelevant when it comes to
divvying up a surplus might also be based on more practical considerations. The
claim might be made that while, in theory, law can have an impact on how surplus
is shared, in practice law will never have a salutatory effect. The intuition behind
this more practical claim would be that so long as the relative bargaining power of
the parties involved is not altered, the more powerful party would find a way to
negotiate around whatever legal requirements are put in place to shift surplus
sharing arrangements.173 Omri Ben-Shahar makes essentially this argument in his
critique of recommendations to require the inclusion of consumer-friendly
provisions in standard form contracts. Ben-Shahar writes that “[a]t best, the
distributive intervention is irrelevant. At worst, it imposes excess transaction costs
and forces an inefficient redesign of the transaction. As long as one party’s market
power is maintained, it is used to dictate the distribution of surplus.”174 This might
be coined the “bargaining power supremacy” hypothesis: what matters in
170

One scholar observes, a “main message of the current research on multi-unit
auctions is that it is very hard to achieve efficient outcomes.” Paul Klemperer, Auction
Theory: A Guide to the Literature, 13 J. ECON. SURV. 227, 243 (1999). With respect to the
meaning of efficiency in this context, see TIMOTHY P. HUBBARD & HARRY J. PAARSCH,
AUCTIONS 73 (2015) (“Auction researchers consider efficiency in a simple way: did the
participant who valued the object the most end up with the object at the conclusion of the
auction?”). For surveys of the auction literature, see, e.g., HUBBARD & PAARSCH, supra;
Klemperer, supra; R. Preston McAfee & John McMillion, Auctions and Bidding, 25 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 699 (1987); Paul Milgrom, Auctions and Bidding: A Primer, 3 J. ECON.
PERSP. 3 (1989); Roger B. Myerson & Mark A. Satterthwaite, Efficient Mechanisms for
Bilateral Trading, 29 J. ECON. THEORY 265 (1983).
171
For differing views as to what is a fair method to share a surplus, see supra note 8
and accompanying text. For further discussion of the claim that distributional effects
should be included when considering legal solutions to the surplus problem, see infra
Subsection II.B.4.
172
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 101–02 (1971).
173
For a discussion of the nature of bargaining power, see Albert Choi & George
Triantis, The Effect of Bargaining Power on Contract Design, 98 VA. L. REV. 1665, 1674–
77 (2012).
174
Omri Ben-Shahar, Fixing Unfair Contracts, 63 STAN. L. REV. 869, 898 (2011).
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determining surplus allocation in a transaction is the relative power of the parties
involved and not the legal regime.
As an example of what a proponent of the bargaining power supremacy
hypothesis might argue, imagine if a law were enacted that required all surplus in
certain transactions be awarded to the party who is less well off. The motivation
behind such a law would be to increase social welfare by redistributing wealth
from the rich to the poor.175 If the bargaining power supremacy hypothesis is
correct, then the party with the superior bargaining power would find a way to
ensure that they continue to receive their desired share of the surplus. As a result,
based on the bargaining power supremacy hypothesis, this “Robin Hood” rule,
despite its good intentions, would not provide redistributional benefits.
The bargaining power supremacy hypothesis is an empirical claim. It is
certainly possible that legal rules will prove irrelevant to the way in which surplus
is ultimately shared in many or most transactions. However, while this is an
interesting hypothesis, it is impossible to know a priori that such a failure of legal
intervention is inevitable.
In fact, evidence about the effects of the Credit Card Accountability
Responsibility and Disclosure Act (“CARD Act”) suggests that the bargaining
power supremacy hypothesis does not hold in at least one important context. The
CARD Act, enacted in 2009, limited “banks’ ability to levy credit card penalty fees
and hike interest rates.”176 The CARD Act was passed in an effort to benefit
consumers; however, the financial services industry argued that the costs of the
CARD Act would ultimately be borne by consumers and not lenders.177 If the
bargaining power supremacy hypothesis were correct then the financial services
industry’s argument would probably prove true.
Findings from a study by Sumit Agarwal and colleagues on the effects of the
CARD Act do not support the bargaining power supremacy hypothesis in this
setting.178 Agarwal and colleagues find that the CARD Act did, in fact, reduce
borrowing costs for consumers without triggering an offsetting reduction in the
volume of credit.179 In other words, these findings suggest the CARD Act shifted
175

Such a rule could have a positive social welfare effect if it is low cost, and we
accept a social welfare function under which each dollar received is of incrementally less
value as the wealth of the recipient increases. As Kaplow and Shavell explain,
“redistributing income from the rich to the poor will tend to raise social welfare, assuming
that the marginal utility of income is greater for the poor than for the rich.” Louis Kaplow
& Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 991 (2001). In fact, a
declining marginal utility of consumption is widely-assumed in economics, although there
are problems with taking this assumption for granted. Zachary D. Liscow, Is Efficiency
Biased?, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1649, 1682–83 (2018).
176
Natasha Sarin, Making Consumer Finance Work, 119 COLUM. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 2).
177
Id.
178
Sumit Agarwal et al., Regulating Consumer Financial Products: Evidence from
Credit Cards, 130 Q.J. ECON. 111 (2015).
179
Id.
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the allocation of surplus toward consumers without offsetting costs. To dismiss
consideration of how law might facilitate fair and efficient sharing of surplus based
on the presumption that all such efforts are doomed to fail shortchanges the
investigation necessary to reach a meaningful conclusion.
In certain situations, legal rules are unlikely to have a significant impact on
how parties behave or on what each party ultimately receives. Law and economics
scholars may have assumed law’s role in sharing surplus is largely irrelevant for
either the theoretical or practical reasons discussed above. To dismiss further
investigation based on this reasoning would be a mistake.
2. Libertarian Concerns
A related presumption might also explain avoidance of the surplus problem by
law and economics scholars. Perhaps these scholars believe state intervention in
privately negotiated transactions, even if potentially efficacious, is not appropriate
if the only stakes involved are the fairness and efficiency of surplus distribution.
Such a view might be held by those who believe that protecting the personal liberty
to enter into private transactions as one wishes is of paramount importance.
There is a long-standing tradition in the United States that parties should be
allowed to arrange many of their private affairs without state intervention. The
Declaration of Independence, for example, describes liberty as an inalienable
right.180 Scholars such as Richard Epstein,181 John Locke,182 John Stuart Mill,183
and Nozik184 argue that the need to protect citizens’ liberty should place significant
constraints on state action. Some of these scholars view implementing legal rules
that override a laissez-faire approach to market transactions as generally
unacceptable, even if intervention would lead to less waste and more equitable
distribution.185 There is little more that can be said here to such scholars, except to
180
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these truths
to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
181
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985).
182
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING
TOLERATION 124 (Ian Shapiro ed., Mockingbird Press 2014) (1690) (“[F]or liberty is to be
free from restraint and violence from others; . . . [and] a liberty to dispose and order freely
as he lists his person, actions, possessions, and his whole property within the allowance of
those laws under which he is, and therein not to be subject to the arbitrary will of another,
but freely follow his own.”).
183
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (The Floating Press 2009) (1859).
184
ROBERT NOZIK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
185
That said, scholars who hold these views of liberty rights might want to address
the question as to why existing property distributions should be treated as creating such
immutable rights. See, e.g., William W. Fisher & Talha Syed, Global Justice in
Healthcare: Developing Drugs for the Developing World, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 602
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observe that giving such strong priority to liberty interests would require
abandoning many current regulatory programs. As Liam Murphy writes in a
similar context, “it must be acknowledged that the discussion that follows will be
beside the point for committed and consistent libertarians.”186
For others who also value freedom in private affairs and prefer a laissez faire
approach to market transactions, their position may not be so absolute as to reject
legal solutions to the surplus problem even when such an intervention enhances
efficiency or promotes equity or both.187 For those who have a preference for
private ordering not as a matter of philosophical imperative but based on a strong
presumption that state action will ultimately prove less effective than a noninterventionist approach, the resistance should not be to investigating the potential
for legal rules to help share surplus more fairly and efficiently, but to reaching
unrealistic conclusions about the efficacy of legal intervention.
In fact, there are aspects of legal solutions to the surplus problem that should
make application of legal rules to private transactions in this context less
problematic from a libertarian perspective than other types of economic policy. For
some libertarians a right to be free from state intervention may be linked to private
property rights. The claim that private property rights include the unconstrained
right to any surplus that might arise out of a market transaction may be weaker
than other entitlements perceived to be granted by dint of ownership.
Perhaps law and economics scholars have shied away from exploring how law
can address the surplus problem because of a concern that this would involve
unacceptable legal intervention into private affairs. Such concerns are unlikely to
provide most law and economics scholars a compelling justification for ignoring
issues related to law and surplus.
3. Reliance on Price Discrimination Scholarship
Misplaced reliance on research by economists on the social welfare effects of
price discrimination is another reason law and economics scholars may have
mistakenly assumed that laissez-faire solutions to the surplus problem should be
preferred without further analysis.
n.40 (2006) (“[T]aking as given existing distributions of wealth, income, and legal
entitlements [] is indefensibly conservative . . . .”).
186
Liam Murphy, Beneficence, Law, and Liberty: The Case of Required Rescue, 89
GEO. L.J. 605, 642 (2001). “Here, freedom from coercion is not understood as a value,
much less an instrumental value in the service of positive liberty, but rather, simply as a
natural right. . . . The idea is simply that a special wrong is done when people coerce other
people.” Id. at 637.
187
I would put conservative law and economics scholars such as Douglas Ginsburg
and Joshua Wright in this less absolutist category. For example, they co-authored an article
in which they identify as important, but not inalienable, “the economic welfare and liberty
value of allowing individuals the freedom to err.” Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H.
Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for
Liberty, 106 NW. L. REV. 1033, 1036 (2012).
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Price discrimination is the practice of charging customers different prices for
reasons other than cost differences.188 One example of a surplus provided in the
Introduction can be used to illustrate how price discrimination works. In that
example, someone who is willing to pay $50 for a copy of “Hillbilly Elegy” only
has to pay $17 for the book on Amazon.189 If Amazon is able to identify this
person and this person chooses not to shop around for the cheapest price, then
Amazon could potentially charge this person $35 for the book and make an
additional $18 in profit.
One economic effect of price discrimination, evident from this example, is to
shift surplus, here $18, from the buyer to seller. Because price discrimination
directly shifts surplus from buyer to seller, price discrimination might reasonably
be described as a frontal assault in the battle for surplus.
Economists have analyzed the social welfare effects of price discrimination
extensively and have generally concluded that price discrimination is rarely
problematic from a social welfare perspective. Pigou, for example, described
several scenarios under which allowing firms to price discriminate would actually
increase efficiency.190 Pigou reaches this conclusion by assuming that sellers
choose between price discrimination and implementing a monopoly-pricing
scheme. Monopoly pricing involves restricting supply to drive up price. One
consequence of monopoly pricing is that certain welfare-enhancing transactions do
not occur, namely those where willingness to pay is greater than cost but less than
the price established by the monopoly seller. If the seller instead chooses to
implement a price discrimination strategy, these lower margin transactions can
take place, increasing social welfare as compared to what happens if the
monopoly-pricing scheme is implemented.
Much work has refined Pigou’s analysis, but most of this subsequent work
reaches a similar conclusion about the social welfare effects of price
discrimination.191 One caveat introduced by subsequent scholarship is recognition
188
In 1920 Professor Arthur C. Pigou provided a comprehensive analysis of price
discrimination practices. PIGOU, supra note 39, at 275–89. Pigou did not, however, use the
term “price discrimination.” For usage of the term “price discrimination,” see, e.g., Daniel
J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, The Law and Economics of Price Discrimination in Modern
Economics: Time for Reconciliation? 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1237 (2010) (defining
price discrimination as “[t]he practice of selling the same good at different prices”).
It should be noted that the discrimination terminology is a bit misleading.
“Discrimination” in this context is not driven by the kind of prejudice or malice typically
associated with discrimination, but rather by the desire to maximize profits by taking
advantage of differences between customers in terms of their willingness to pay and
sensitivity to price changes.
189
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
190
PIGOU, supra note 39, at 275–89.
191
For surveys of the price discrimination literature, see Lars A. Stole, Price
Discrimination and Competition, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION VOL. 3,
2225–27 (M. Armstrong & R. Porter eds., 2007); Hal R. Varian, Price Discrimination, in
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION VOL. 1, 598 (R. Schmalensee & R. D. Willig
eds., 1989). For textbook discussions of price discrimination, see FRANK, supra note 2, at
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that it may be incorrect to compare outcomes under price discrimination with what
would happen if monopoly-pricing policies were implemented instead. Scholars
writing after Pigou recognized that many firms, in fact, most firms, are able to
price discriminate, whereas far fewer have enough market power to implement a
monopoly-pricing scheme.192 When the assumption that firms are choosing
between price discrimination and monopoly pricing is relaxed, it becomes more
difficult to reach general conclusions about the social welfare effects of price
discrimination. As a result, economists are now only comfortable predicting the
social welfare effects of price discrimination in a few special and rather unrealistic
scenarios.193
To some degree at least, law and economics scholars appear to rely on
research suggesting the welfare effects of price discrimination are largely
indeterminate to dismiss the need for further investigation of law and the surplus
problem. For example, Oren Bar-Gill in “Algorithmic Price Discrimination: When
Demand is a Function of Both Preferences and (Mis)perceptions,” appears to
justify skipping over a consideration of the relationship between law and surplus
for this reason. Bar-Gill reviews the “standard” economic analysis of price
discrimination and concludes from this review that the practice of price
389–98; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 2, at 401–10; VARIAN, supra note 2, at 241–
53.
192
Einer Elhauge observes that “the price discrimination normally taken to evidence
market power is so ubiquitous that it would indicate market power exists everywhere.”
Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV. 253, 258
(2003). See also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 153, at 15 (“[T]he amount of power
implied by price discrimination can be very small, and may indicate no more than a
competitive market that contains a differentiated product that some customers value at
more than cost.”); Benjamin Klein & John Shepard Wiley Jr., Competitive Price
Discrimination as an Antitrust Justification for Intellectual Property Refusals to Deal, 70
ANTITRUST L.J. 599, 610 (2003) (“Because product differentiation is normal and pervasive
in real-world markets, price discrimination can be expected to be normal and pervasive as
well.”); Varian, supra note 191, at 598 (“Price discrimination is one of the most prevalent
forms of marketing practices.”).
The reason price discrimination is so ubiquitous is that the conditions necessary to
carry out price discrimination are not particularly demanding. It is generally agreed that
three conditions must exist for a firm to be able to price discriminate: “(i) firms [must] have
short-run market power, (ii) consumers can be segmented either directly or indirectly, and
(iii) arbitrage across differently priced goods is infeasible.” Stole, supra note 191; see also
Varian, supra note 191, at 599.
193
See, e.g., AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 153, at 13–14; Gifford & Kudrle,
supra note 188, at 1252 (“The academic literature establishes definite welfare results for
price discrimination only for a small set of well-defined cases that, in general, would be
hard to identify in the real world.”) (footnote omitted); Penelope Papandropoulos, How
Should Price Discrimination Be Dealt With By Competition Authorities?, 3 DROIT &
ÉCONOMIE: CONCURRENCES 34, 37 (2007) (“[T]he effects of price discrimination are
multiple, complex and highly dependent on the competitive environment in which firms
operate.”).
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discrimination “harms consumers but increases efficiency.”194 In his article, BarGill relies on this conclusion to shift his analysis away from the social welfare
effects of price discrimination and toward situations in which sellers take
advantage of consumer misperceptions in order to convince consumers to purchase
goods they would not have otherwise purchased.195
Joshua Wright, an economist, legal scholar, and former Federal Trade
Commissioner, has an even more sanguine view as to the implications of price
discrimination scholarship for the need to study regulating this particular form of
surplus capture.196 Wright writes that:
In sum, while economics provides no single universal welfare
theorem for all arrangements involving price discrimination, . . . price
discrimination is nothing to fear from a competition and efficiency
perspective. When one accounts for both static and dynamic welfare
effects, competitive price discrimination is likely to result in lower
prices, higher output, and increased innovation.197
If Wright is right that the unregulated effects of price discrimination are
generally positive, then there would be less reason for further investigation into
how law might address the surplus problem, particularly in the context of
regulating price discrimination.
However, it is a mistake to rely on findings by economists about the mixed
social welfare effects of price discrimination to avoid careful study of the ways in
which legal rules can ameliorate the surplus problem. There are too many
inapposite assumptions in the price discrimination scholarship to justify
extrapolating from this research to questions of law and surplus. Most problematic
is the assumption in almost all of the price discrimination scholarship that no costs
are incurred when carrying out price discrimination.198 This assumption is
194
Bar-Gill, supra note 116, at 2. Bar-Gill recognizes that he reaches this simple
conclusion about the social welfare effects of price discrimination, because he chooses to
“focus on the extreme, monopoly case for ease of exposition.” Id. at 13.
195
Id. at 2 (“When price discrimination targets misperceptions, specifically demandinflating misperceptions, it hurts consumers even more and might also reduce efficiency.”).
For a broader discussion of consumer law scholars’ avoidance of the surplus problem, see
infra Part III.
196
For biographical information on Professor Wright, see Biographical Sketch:
Joshua Wright, GEORGE MASON UNIV. ANTONIN SCALIA LAW SCH.,
https://www.law.gmu.edu/faculty/directory/fulltime/wright_joshua [https://perma.cc/ZX6N
-SUBZ].
197
Joshua Wright, Price Discrimination Is Good, Part I, in TRUTH ON THE MARKET 2
(2008). Wright also argues that the welfare effects of price discrimination are generally
going to be progressive rather than regressive. (“To the extent that it is true that the lower
income groups are the price-sensitive group, price discrimination generally benefits the
lower income group at the expense of the higher income group.”). Id.
198
But see Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private Ordering in Information
Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063, 2072 (2000) (“Implementing price discrimination is
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obviously false. Carrying out price discrimination is inevitably a costly endeavor.
This insight follows naturally from the discussion above of the link between
surplus and wasteful competition identified by those studying rent-seeking, and the
difficulty in avoiding these costs even outside of the context of competition for
government granted monopoly rights.199
It is a mistake to dismiss consideration of how law can facilitate the fair and
efficient sharing of surplus based on the economic analysis of the social welfare
effects of price discrimination. Such a presumption ignores one of the central
challenges of the surplus problem: how to reduce the wasteful competition that the
existence of a surplus tends to invite.
4. Fairness Considerations Inapposite
Finally, there may be law and economics scholars who would welcome the
idea of more carefully exploring efficiency considerations that arise when
considering how legal rules might be used to allocate surplus, but would reject the
notion that considerations of fairness or distributive justice should also be included
in the analysis.
There are three different arguments that could be made to justify excluding
fairness considerations from law and surplus analysis. First, one could argue that
fairness consideration is inapposite because tax policy is superior to legal policy as
an instrument to achieve redistributive goals. Second, scholars might be concerned
that introducing fairness considerations into the analysis of surplus sharing
arrangements would raise insurmountable analytical challenges. Third, some might
argue that firms acting on their own will modify pricing policies to address
consumer fairness concerns, and so regulatory interventions designed to address
these concerns are unnecessary. Each of these three rationales for dismissing
fairness considerations when evaluating legal solutions to the surplus problem, and
where these rationales fall short, is discussed next.
First, many law and economics scholars presume that tax policy is superior to
other legal interventions if the goal is to achieve a fair distribution of resources.200
costly.”); Peter T. Leeson & Russell S. Sobel, Costly Price Discrimination, 99 ECON.
LETTERS 206, 208 (2008) (noting how even “under plausible conditions price searchers are
led to pursue ‘too much’ perfect price discrimination, generating welfare losses even when
perfect price discrimination is used.”).
Nor is there any effort made to estimate the costs of regulating price discrimination.
But see prescient observations made by Richard Posner in The Social Costs of Monopoly
and Regulation, in JAMES M. BUCHANAN ET AL., TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENTSEEKING SOCIETY 88–89 (1980) (“Even when price discrimination is perfect, so that the
deadweight loss of monopoly is zero, the total social costs of a discriminating monopoly
are greater” because of “the costs of administering the price-discrimination scheme . . . .”).
Posner then goes on to observe that for the analysis to be complete one must also include
the potential “costs of administering anti-discrimination rules.” Id.
199
See supra Part I.
200
See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient
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Kyle Logue and Ronen Avraham go so far as to speculate that “it is a safe bet that
a majority of legal economists hold the following view: Whatever amount of
redistribution is deemed appropriate or desirable, the exclusive policy tool for
redistribution to reduce income or wealth inequality should always be the tax-andtransfer system.”201
Scholars colloquially refer to the argument that tax policy is the preferable
instrument when the goal is wealth redistribution as the “double distortion”
argument. The logic of the double distortion argument is as follows. Favoring
certain legal rules over others because they have a desirable effect on the
distribution of wealth causes two distortions. First, rules adopted for this reason
will be less efficient than the more efficient alternative, because the proposal under
consideration involves choosing a rule other than the most efficient rule. Second,
there will be a loss of efficiency from adopting such a rule because it will create a
disincentive to gather wealth. This second effect is the same disincentive that
results from implementing redistributive tax policies: implementing a
than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGIS. STUD. 667 (1994); Steven
Shavell, A Note on Efficiency vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rulemaking: Should
Distributional Equity Matter Given Optimal Income Taxation?, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 414
(1981); Van Loo, Consumer Law, supra note 101, at 3 (reviewing “the longstanding
scholarly paradigm that taxes are the best mechanism for redistribution because they are
the less inefficient option”) (footnote omitted). More recently, Kaplow shows conditions
under which this presumption holds even when firms have varying amounts of market
power. Louis Kaplow, Market Power and Income Taxation (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 25578, 2019). This general line of argument is foreshadowed
in MUSGRAVE, supra note 38, at 18.
201
Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal
Rules, and Insurance, 56 TAX L. REV. 157, 158 (2003) (emphasis added).
It should be noted that the argument for disregarding distributional effects when
evaluating law and policy alternatives is now under attack by a number of scholars. See,
e.g., David Blankfein-Tabachnick & Kevin A. Kordana, Kaplow and Shavell and the
Priority of Income Taxation and Transfer, 69 HASTINGS L. REV. 1, 27 (2017) (arguing that
alterations in the initial assignment of property rights are sometimes better than income
taxation as a way to achieve distributive or egalitarian goals); Lee Anne Fennell & Richard
H. McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in Law and Economics, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1051,
1053 (2016) (arguing that relative political action costs justify using legal rules rather than
tax policy to achieve redistributive goals in certain circumstances); Zachary Liscow,
Reducing Inequality on the Cheap: When Legal Rule Design Should Incorporate Equity as
Well as Efficiency, 123 YALE L.J. 2478, 2483 (2014) (identifying benefits of using the legal
system rather than tax policy to redistribute wealth in situations when allocating legal
entitlements to the poor or based on non-income factors, because the tax system is poorly
equipped to achieve redistribution in these contexts); Chris Sanchirico, Deconstructing the
New Efficiency Rationale, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1008–09 (2001) (presenting several
challenges to the “double-distortion” argument for focusing exclusively on the efficiency
effects of private law rules); Matthew Dimmick, The Law and Economics of Redistribution
1 (Nov. 21, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3072678
[https://perma.cc/3QFX-F5J2] (reviewing the debate about whether to include
redistributive effects when evaluating legal rules).
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redistributive tax or enacting a redistributive law creates a subsidy for leisure,
because leisure is not taxed.
The two distortions identified by the double distortion argument are thus: (1)
such a rule will be less efficient than the optimal rule; and (2) such a rule will
discourage labor and encourage leisure. The preferable alternative, according to
this line of argument, is to adopt the most efficient legal rules and then implement
the most efficient tax policy. In adopting this preferred approach, there will be only
one distortion, that from discouraging labor and encouraging leisure, rather than
two distortions.
However, the double distortion argument does not justify ignoring
redistributive benefits when evaluating alternative legal solutions to the surplus
problem.202 One of the assumptions that triggers application of the double
distortion rationale for ignoring the distributional effects of legal rules is that an
optimal legal rule can be identified based on considerations other than
distributional effects.203 However, in making the determination as to what the
optimal rule for addressing the surplus problem would be, it makes perfect sense to
consider distributional effects. More generally, if a particular law can facilitate
wealth redistribution at a lower cost than tax policy, a plausible assumption in at
least some situations, it makes sense to include consideration of these
distributional effects in selecting the optimal rule.204 Determining how to allocate a
surplus is often likely to be such a situation.
A simple numerical example may be helpful here. Let us again go back to the
individual who wants to purchase a copy of “Hillbilly Elegy” and is willing to pay
up to $50 for the book.205 Except now the reason our purchaser is willing to pay so
much for the book has nothing to do with her wealth. In fact, she is quite poor, but
the book is about her hometown and, therefore, owning a copy is of immense value
to her despite her poverty. If we put in place a law that prohibits Amazon from
using price discrimination to charge her more than Amazon’s cost, we would
presumably be redistributing wealth in a desirable way without creating any
allocative inefficiency. This example is similar to Ricardo’s example of what
would happen if rents were transferred from landowners to farmers.206 This
example is not meant to champion a plausible policy recommendation, but rather
202
It is beyond the scope of this Article to provide an analytically rigorous defense of
this claim.
203
More specifically, the model in Kaplow and Shavell assumes a rule that is
designed to encourage parties to take an efficient level of care when undertaking activities.
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 200, at 677–78.
204
See, e.g., Nathaniel Hendren, Efficient Welfare Weights (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 20351, 2017) (developing a method to evaluate project
efficiency that takes into account the distortionary cost of redistributive taxation); Liscow,
supra note 175, at 1653 (expressing a similar idea in a more general context) (footnote
omitted).
205
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
206
See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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to illustrate that the double distortion analysis does not apply with the same force
when evaluating how laws might be used to divvy up surplus.
A second objection to including considerations of fairness when evaluating
whether to use legal rules to divvy up surplus might be a concern that carrying out
the necessary evaluation presents legal scholars with insurmountable analytical
challenges. Balancing fairness considerations with efficiency considerations might
appear to require trading off incommensurate benefits. However, this is a familiar
problem that can be overcome. There is a well-established analytical framework
for balancing the efficiency and fairness effects of a given policy. That framework
is based on the use of a social welfare function.207 In fact, much policy analysis is
based on a social welfare function analytic framework.208 The challenge of
weighing fairness concerns against efficiency costs is not unique to analysis of
how law can improve surplus sharing arrangements.
A third argument that may underpin a claim that analysis of the relationship
between law and surplus should not include fairness concerns is a more subtle one.
To explain this argument, it is helpful to begin with a naïve justification for
including fairness considerations when evaluating legal intervention into the
process by which surplus is allocated among participants in market transactions.
This naïve argument would proceed as follows: we need legal rules to
regulate how surplus is allocated among participants in market transactions
because people have strongly held views about their right to equal treatment in
market transactions. Scholars have done research showing that people do, in fact,
have strongly held views about such a right.209 In one well-known experiment,
Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch, and Richard Thaler found that consumers viewed
price increases as fair, only if the price increases were the result of cost increases,
and otherwise viewed price increases as unfair.210 Consistent with this finding,
207

See MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 2, at 117 (“The idea behind a social welfare
function is that it accurately expresses society's judgments on how individual utilities have
to be compared to produce an ordering of possible social outcomes.”); see also MATTHEW
D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
(2012).
A social welfare function first “conceptualizes the status quo and each policy
alternative as a pattern of well-being across the population of concern.” Matthew D. Adler,
A Better Calculus for Regulators: From Cost-Benefit Analysis to the Social Welfare
Function 2 (Duke Univ. Philosophy & Public Policy, Working Paper, 2017). These patterns
of “well-being across the population of concern” are then converted into aggregate wellbeing levels based on an agreed-upon social welfare function. Id.
208
Liscow, supra note 175, at 1653 n.17 (describing welfare economics).
209
A large body of the research in the field of experimental economics provides
ample evidence that people are willing to spend resources to achieve what they view as
fairer outcomes. See, e.g., Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, Cooperation and Punishment in
Public Goods Experiments, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 980 (2000).
210
Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements
in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728 (1986); see also Kelly L. Haws & William O.
Bearden, Dynamic Pricing and Consumer Fairness Perceptions, 33 J. CONSUMER RES. 304
(2006); Julio J. Rotemberg, Fair Pricing, 9 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 952 (2011); Lan Xia et al.,
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price discrimination, which by definition involves increasing prices for reasons
other than cost, is perceived as unfair by the vast majority of consumers.211 A
survey of 1,500 adults in the United States found that a large majority of the
population (87%) thought it was unfair for an online store to charge people
different prices for the same products during the same hour.212
Continuing with the naïve argument linking a taste for fair pricing to legal
intervention, it is, moreover, entirely appropriate to treat this widely held
preference for “fair” treatment in market transactions as legitimate. Attitudes about
a right to fair treatment in the marketplace are similar to other tastes that policy
analysts include in their analysis without regard for where those tastes come from.
Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell endorse this view in their book “Fairness versus
Welfare.”213 Kaplow and Shavell explain “that individuals have a taste for a notion
of fairness, just as they may have a taste for art, nature, or fine wine . . . . In such
cases, satisfying the principle of fairness enhances the individual’s well-being, just
as would satisfying his preference for wine.”214
A logical and powerful response to this naïve justification for legal
intervention designed to address customers’ fairness concerns is that legal
intervention is unnecessary in this situation. The idea behind this response is that
firms will modify pricing policies to address consumer fairness concerns without
the need for legal intervention. There is, in fact, evidence that firms do take tastes
for fairness in pricing into account when deciding upon their pricing policies.215
For example, firms sometimes shelter consumers from cost increases out of fear
that consumers will believe the firm is trying to raise prices unfairly.216
The Price Is Unfair! A Conceptual Framework of Price Fairness Perceptions, 68 J.
MARKETING 1, 1 (2004) (“[R]esearchers have developed and adapted various theories to
obtain an understanding of when and how buyers form price fairness judgments.”).
211
Papandropoulos, supra note 193, at 37 (“[P]rice discrimination carries a highly
negative stigma. . . .”). For a review of the relevant research, see ARIEL EZRACHI &
MAURICE STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION: THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF THE ALGORITHMDRIVEN ECONOMY 123–24 (2016).
212
JOSEPH TUROW ET AL., OPEN TO EXPLOITATION: AMERICAS SHOPPERS ONLINE AND
OFFLINE (2005), http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1035&context=
asc_papers [https://perma.cc/9EE7-92KL].
213
LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002).
214
Id. at 21. Such an approach does leave the resulting analysis open to the challenge
that it incorporates tastes that may be hard to justify normatively, that may be difficult to
predict, and that may prove to be unprincipled.
215
See, e.g., Brian T. McCann & George A. Shinkle, Attention to Fairness Versus
Profits: The Determinants of Satisficing Pricing, 54 J. MGMT. STUD. 583 (2017).
216
See, e.g., Neal Irwin, Why Surge Prices Make Us So Mad, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14,
2017, at BU1 (“There is no surge pricing at Home Depot stores after a disaster, in both a
longstanding corporate policy and a matter of law in many states. But the company doesn’t
stop with that. All those logistics people and other staffers are there to ensure that the surge
in demand after a disaster is matched with a higher supply of the goods people need.”);
Erik Eyster et al., Pricing When Customers Care About Fairness But Misinfer Markups, 6–
11 (Nat’l. Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23778, 2017) (reviewing
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There is some validity in this criticism of the naïve argument for legal
intervention as a way to address consumer preference for fair pricing practices.
Firms are aware of customer preferences for fair pricing, and so, in the absence of
some other market failure, firms should incorporate these customer tastes into their
pricing policy to an appropriate degree. The problem with this solution is the
problem endemic to the fight for surplus. A firm’s gains from aggressive pricing
practices likely deviate significantly from the social welfare gains from such
pricing practices. Gains from aggressive pricing practices will often simply consist
of transfers of surplus from consumers to sellers. Thus, firms are balancing a taste
for fairness, a valid social welfare consideration, against a gain from aggressive
pricing practices, a policy that is much less likely to provide true social welfare
gains. As is often the case when dealing with the surplus problem, one party’s
gains are simply another party’s losses, and do not increase social welfare.
Law and economics scholars have ignored, for the most part, the question of
how law can help to share a surplus in a fair and efficient manner.217 However, the
implicit assumptions upon which they appear to rely to justify avoiding this topic
are flawed. First, while there may be situations where legal rules are ineffectual,
there is little evidence to suggest that laws altering how surplus is shared will
universally fall into this category. Second, libertarian objections to regulating
market activity are unlikely to provide most law and economics scholars an
adequate justification for ignoring how legal rules can address the surplus problem.
Third, analyses of the social welfare effects of price discrimination developed by
economists fail to consider costs from precisely the type of wasteful competition
for surplus that are central to the study of law and surplus. Finally, dismissing the
importance of engaging with fairness concerns when considering how legal rules
can address the surplus problem fails to recognize that this is the type of legal
intervention where legal solutions are not inferior to tax policy as a way to
redistribute wealth. Law and economics scholarship has mistakenly avoided an
important way in which legal rules can enhance social welfare.
III. CONSUMER LAW, MARKET FAILURES, AND SURPLUS
The question of how legal rules can and should be used to protect consumers
from malevolent business practices is a broad area of research.218 It would be
evidence of seller sensitivity to perceptions of fairness). Recognition that firms take into
account customer tastes for fair pricing goes back to Pigou. Pigou observed that “since a
hostile public opinion might lead to legislative intervention, [the monopolist’s] choice must
not be such as to outrage the popular sense of justice.” PIGOU, supra note 39, at 162.
217
But see supra Section II.A.
218
See, e.g., KATHERINE PORTER, MODERN CONSUMER LAW (2016) (problem-based
casebook introducing law students to the ways in which legal rules regulate consumer
transactions); DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE LAW
(2018) (discussing a wide range of topics like obtaining credit, Truth-in-Lending
disclosures, regulation of the price of credit, debt collection, and the credit consumer’s
remedies for various problems); Richard Hynes & Eric A. Posner, The Law and Economics
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natural to expect that scholars studying the role laws play in protecting consumers
in market transactions to be among those most intent on investigating how legal
rules can help to divvy up surplus fairly and efficiently. On first reading, one might
even get the impression that legal scholars studying consumer protection have
directed their research at precisely this question.
However, a more careful reading of scholarship on consumer law reveals that
these scholars, particularly those who are oriented toward using the tools of
economic analysis, have avoided considering issues related to law and surplus.219
For the most part, economically-oriented consumer law scholars have chosen,
instead, to turn to more familiar market failure arguments to justify consumer law
protections. One consequence of this choice is that questions about the links
between the surplus problem and consumer law are woefully underexplored,
despite the natural relationship between these two areas of scholarship. This
represents another significant missed opportunity for legal scholarship.
A simple numerical example can illuminate how central questions of law and
surplus should be to protecting consumers in market transactions. Consider again
the example in the Introduction of an individual who is willing to pay $50 to
purchase a copy of “Hillbilly Elegy” while the market price for the book on
Amazon is $17.220 Given these starting assumptions, there are certain
circumstances under which most would agree that malevolent behavior by the
seller would cause a social welfare loss. For example, suppose the seller falsely
claims that the copy for sale was originally owned by the author and then sells the
book to our would-be purchaser for $60 based on this false premise. In this
situation, the purchaser is paying $10 more than she would have if she were not
deceived.221
of Consumer Finance, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 168 (2002) (reviewing regulations that
specifically apply to consumer financing transactions).
219
One reason for the dearth of law and surplus analysis by these scholars may be the
links between the types of questions raised by law and surplus analysis and questions
related to the apparent unfairness of certain business practices. In the 1960s and 1970s the
FTC began to adopt policies aimed at addressing fairness concerns, but this led to a
backlash against relying on fairness considerations to justify consumer protection law. For
discussions of the backlash against FTC policy based on forays into reliance on fairness
concerns, see, e.g., William MacLeod et al., Three Rules and a Constitution: Consumer
Protection Finds Its Limits in Competition Policy, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 943, 945 (2005)
(describing the “Commission’s effort to rescue its unfairness authority from the hostile
forces unleashed by the Children’s Advertising rulemaking”); J. Howard Beals, The FTC’s
Use of Unfairness Authority: Its Rise, Fall, and Resurrection, FED. TRADE COMMISSION
(May 30, 2003), https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2003/05/ftcs-use-unfairnessauthority-its-rise-fall-and-resurrection [https://perma.cc/MR5X-VALS].
220
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
221
As Tullock explained, actual calculation of the social harm in this situation is
complex, because, on the one hand, the $10 is a transfer, and social harm from the transfer
may not be the full $10. On the other hand, the possibility of deception may launch an arms
race between would be deceivers and those who do not wish to be deceived. See Tullock,
Welfare Costs, supra note 47.
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However, the extent of the social welfare loss is less clear if the seller is able
to convince the buyer to purchase the book for $50, based on the same falsehood,
rather than $60. In this scenario, the buyer is now paying no more than she would
be willing to pay, even if the author did not originally own the copy of the book
she purchased. The insight here is that the consequence of the deception in this
scenario is simply a transfer of surplus from buyer to seller. If we choose to ignore
surplus transfers then an important facet of the cost of this deception is not
included in the computation.
The analysis of whether and to what extent there is a social welfare loss when
selling practices shift surplus from buyer to seller becomes even more uncertain if
the seller does not act in a deceptive manner. For example, what is the harm if the
seller takes advantage of an astute ability to determine various buyers’ willingness
to pay and uses this ability to charge our buyer $50? What if the seller instead uses
sophisticated algorithms that take advantage of behavioral failings of the buyer, but
the purchase price remains at or below the buyer’s “true” reservation price of $50?
Does legal intervention only make sense when the purchase price exceeds a
buyer’s reservation price regardless of the inefficiencies and regressive nature of
other transactions?
One would expect those studying consumer law to grapple with the more
subtle and complex scenarios discussed above, as well as the simpler one where
consumers enter into transactions they otherwise would not, and the harm to
consumers is more self-evident. Addressing these more nuanced scenarios would
involve considering how legal rules can and should address the surplus problem.
However, as detailed below, consumer law scholars instead have relied on more
familiar market failure arguments to analyze the propriety of consumer law.
A. Lemons Market Failure
Much reliance is placed by economically-oriented consumer law scholars on
market failures arising from the lemons market failure described by George
Akerlof.222 Akerlof observed that in markets where it is difficult to ascertain
product quality, the availability of poor quality products can force those selling
higher quality products to exit the market.
The dynamic Akerlof describes proceeds as follows. First, there must be some
degree of information asymmetry.223 This means there are features of the product
about which purchasers cannot freely acquire information at the time of purchase.
The prototypical example comes from the used car market where it is assumed that
certain cars are predisposed to fail (the “lemons”).224 Sellers know when their car

222

See Akerlof, supra note 33.
Id. at 490–91.
224
Id. at 489–90.
223
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is a lemon but it is difficult for the buyer to discern if a car for sale is a lemon. A
dynamic ensues wherein the buyer logically assumes the only car the seller will
sell is a lemon, and the belief becomes self-fulfilling.225
There are numerous examples of consumer law scholars relying on the lemons
market failure to justify regulatory intervention. Perhaps the most significant is
“Making Credit Safer” by Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth Warren, because this article
provided analytical support for creation of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau.226 In their article, Bar-Gill and Warren draw an analogy between the need
for laws that protect consumers from dangerous physical products and the need for
laws to protect consumers from dangerous financial products. The implication is
that both markets are likely to suffer from the same kinds of problems in the
absence of regulatory intervention.
Bar-Gill and Warren are not explicit about which particular market failure
allows sellers to profit by selling unsafe physical products and unsafe financial
products, but their discussion suggests that at least part of the underlying problem
is a lemons market failure. Bar-Gill and Warren write:
Theory predicts and data confirm that markets for credit products
are failing . . . . Regulation assured that no manufacturer had to compete
with another manufacturer who was willing to produce unsafe products
for less money. But regulation has not built the same floor under
financial products. To restore efficiency to consumer credit markets, the
same kind of basic safety regulation is needed.227
The logic of the Bar-Gill and Warren argument appears to be that features of
both physical and financial products may be difficult to discern at the time of
purchase, so cost competition will leave firms seeking to remain profitable with no
choice but to sell both unsafe physical products and unsafe financial products.
The lemons market failure is, of course, different than the surplus problem.
The lemons market failure arises if there is some amount of information
asymmetry with respect to product quality between buyer and seller, whereas the
surplus problem can be present even when buyer and seller share the same
information about product quality. The costly and often regressive fight for surplus
does not arise only where a lemons market failure exists. As a result, solutions to

225

There is no reason to sell a car that is not a lemon for the going market price,
which is based on the presumption that all cars for sale are lemons. Id. at 490.
226
Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PENN. L. REV. 1
(2008).
227
Id. at 69. Bar-Gill and Warren observe in a similar vein that: “Today, consumers
can enter the market to buy physical products, confident that they will not be deceived into
buying exploding toasters and other unreasonably dangerous products. . . . Consumers
entering the market to buy financial products should enjoy the same benefits.” Id. at 7.
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the lemons market failure, such as mandating a minimum level of quality or
developing a reliable mechanism for issuing valid warranties, do not provide
insight into how to solve the surplus problem in the consumer law context.228
If we rely on the lemons market failure without also considering the surplus
problem to justify protecting consumers from unsafe financial products the scope
of the analysis will be incomplete. What if, for example, the economic result of
selling “unsafe” financial products is only to extract surplus from consumers rather
than lead consumers to consummate transactions that they would not otherwise
have entered into? What if, in other words, untoward conduct leads the would-be
purchaser to pay more than she might otherwise have preferred but still less than
her willingness-to-pay.229 Focusing on a lemons market failure cannot address this
question.
B. Behavioral Exploitation
Another set of market failures that economically-oriented consumer law
scholars rely on to justify legal intervention into consumer transactions are those
that arise from predictable imperfections in consumer decision-making. Pernicious
sellers may be able to take advantage of these failings because most consumers
(but not the sellers) are generally unaware of or unable to correct these fallings at a
low cost.230 One term used to describe how pernicious sellers take advantage of
predictable shortcomings in consumer decision-making is behavioral
exploitation.231
228

See Akerlof, supra note 33, at 499–500; see also Richard Craswell, Passing on the
Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN.
L. REV. 361 (1991) (describing conditions under which laws governing transactions, such
as mandating warranties, will affect the efficiency and equity between transacting parties,
and observing that a divergence between equity and efficiency goals arises only from the
presence of inframarginal buyers or sellers).
229
See supra notes 220, 221, and accompanying text.
230
Bar-Gill observes, for example, “when consumers are imperfectly rational, sellers
compete by designing pricing schemes that create an appearance of a lower price.” Oren
Bar-Gill, Consumer Transactions, in BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 469 (Eyal
Zamir & Doron Teichman eds., 2014). This market failure is not necessarily independent of
the lemons market failure. Bar-Gill, for example, observes how the lemons market failure
can interact with this market failure to effectively force all firms to either take advantage of
behavioral exploitation opportunities or exit the market. OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY
CONTRACT 2 (2012) (“[C]ompetition forces sellers to exploit the biases and misperceptions
of their customers.”).
231
Martin Brenncke, The Legal Framework for Financial Advertising: Curbing
Behavioural Exploitation, 3 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 1 (2018). Rory Van Loo uses the term
behavioral overcharge to describe a similar phenomenon. Van Loo defines “behavioral
overcharge” as a situation where there are “higher prices paid as a result of information
asymmetries and behavioral biases.” Van Loo, Consumer Law, supra note 101, at 1 and 13.
The term behavioral contract theory is also used to describe the study of what is here
labeled behavioral exploitation. See, e.g., Botond Kőszegi, Behavioral Contract Theory, 52
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The prototypical example of behavioral exploitation occurs when a seller is
able to charge a higher price than that seller otherwise might by taking advantage
of differences between a buyer’s “decision utility,” which determines the choices
people make, and that same buyer’s “experienced utility,” which reflects the actual
benefits received.232 There is now a substantial and growing body of research into
seller efforts to take advantage of these and other kinds of consumer decisionmaking shortcomings. Bar-Gill, for example, has authored or co-authored several
articles and a book that document situations where firms increase profits by taking
advantage of these kinds of consumer mistakes.233
Consumer law scholars connect behavioral exploitation to the potential
benefits of legal intervention in the following way. Behavioral exploitation may
have an effect on the overall allocative efficiency of the economy, because without
legal intervention the demand for goods will be based on their anticipated utility at
the time the consumer makes the purchase decision rather the utility the consumer
actually experiences. As a result, consumers will purchase more or different goods
than they would had they made the purchase decision based on their experienced
utility, reducing allocative efficiency.
Analyzing these distortions from behavioral exploitation allows consumer law
scholars to reach policy conclusions about how to reduce social harms from
behavioral exploitation. One recommendation is to impose disclosure requirements
that can help close the gap between decision utility and experienced utility.234
However, once again, a more complete analysis would evaluate the social welfare
costs and benefits when a purchaser is “tricked” by a behavioral manipulation, but
this trickery does not lead the buyer to purchase at a price that exceeds her
reservation price.235 If the consummation of a transaction is not altered, but the
allocation of surplus is altered, the economic consequences are real but the policy
questions raised are beyond the scope of the analysis of the costs of behavioral
exploitation as currently framed.
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Consumer law scholars in relying on the lemons market failure and behavioral
exploitation to justify regulatory intervention into consumer financial regulation
ignore many of the transactions that consumers find problematic. Failing to include
questions related to law and surplus in the consumer law context is an opportunity
missed.
CONCLUSION
Surplus is an important and ubiquitous feature of market economies. The
dollar amounts involved are almost certainly in the trillions of dollars. This surplus
presents society with both opportunities and challenges. The opportunities come
from the significant dollar amounts involved. The challenges come from the
likelihood of a socially wasteful competition for all that surplus. How laws can
seize on these opportunities and mitigate these challenges should be a rich area of
legal research. As detailed above, this is an area of research that legal scholars
have failed to address adequately, even when their research would naturally appear
to require addressing precisely these questions.
However, identifying shortcomings in previous scholarship only begins the
process of bringing the problems involving law and surplus to mainstream legal
analysis where it rightly belongs. This Article is a call for action, an awakening.
The time is now to explore how law can best play this important role in bringing
more fairness and efficiency to economic activity throughout our society.

